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NOTES
GRAYMAIL: THE DISCLOSE OR DISMISS
DILEMMA IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
4 defendant's request for class/fed information in a criminal prosecution often
places the Government in a "disclose or dismiss" dilemma: it must choose between
disclosing the information or dismissing theprosecution. This Note examines recent
prosecutions which brought the use of this "graymail" tactic into public view. After
weighing the Government's and defendant's interests in graymail-type prosecutions,
the Note analyses the advantages and disadvantages of the mechanisms presently
available to resolve the dilemma. The author also examines the proposed congres-
sional reforms* which seek to create a uniform system of rulesfor the disclosure of
classfled information during the course of criminal prosecutions. The Note con-
cludes, however, that such a cod/fcation would prove to be cumbersome and ineF-
cient. As an alternative it proposes a resolution of the dilemma which incorporates
the congressional goals into the existing rules of evidence and criminal procedure.
INTRODUCTION
THE PRIMARY GOAL of criminal procedure is to secure a just
adjudication before the court by carefully balancing the gov-
ernment's interests in deterrence and retribution against the de-
fendant's interests in life and liberty.' Submitting classified
information' regarding national security3 matters as evidence in a
criminal prosecution, however, generates additional concerns
which must be factored into this traditional balancing.
In light of these concerns, the court must balance the Govern-
* For a discussion of the legislation enacted by Congress while this Note was in the
final stages of publication, see Author's Note following the Conclusion.
1. See generally Goldstein, The State andthe Accused Balance of.Advantage in Crim-
inal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1149-50 (1960).
2. "'Classified information' means information or material ... that is owned by,
produced for or by, or under the control of, the United States Government, and that has
been determined pursuant to this Order or prior Orders"to require protection against unau-
thorized disclosure, and that is so designated." Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg.
28,949, 28,961 (1978).
Information may be classified as "top secret," "secret," or "confidential," depending on
the expected degree of harm which its unauthorized disclosure would cause to national
security: the disclosure of top secret information would cause "exceptionally grave dam-
age," disclosure of secret information would cause "serious damage," and disclosure of
confidential information would cause "identifiable damage." Id at 28,950.
3. "'National Security' means the defense and foreign relations of the United
States." Id at 28,961.
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ment's claim of a state secrets privilege against the defendant's
request for disclosure. Consequently, the use of classified infor-
mation in criminal litigation creates a "disclose or dismiss" di-
lemma for the Government: either disclose the information in
open court, possibly compromising the national security interests
at stake, or dismiss the charges against the defendant.' This dis-
close or dismiss dilemma, frequently used as a defense tactic to
force the Government to abandon its proceedings, is actually a
subtle form of blackmail and, as such, has been labeled
"graymail. '" 5
Graymail creates a perplexing situation across a spectrum of
criminal offenses.' Often, enforcement of the laws designed to
4. See 125 CONG. REC. H5763 (daily ed. July 11, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Murphy);
GraymailLegislation: Hearings on H.A 4736 & H.A 4745 Before the Subcomm. on Legisla-
lion of the House Permanent Select Comm on Intelligence, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 2-4 (1979)
(statement of Phillip B. Heymann) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H. 4736 & H.R
4745].
5. The graymail threat in criminal prosecution may be either express or implied. An
express graymail threat occurs when the defendant pressures for the release of classified
information as a means of forcing the Government to drop the prosecution or when the
defense threatens the Government with the disclosure of classified information in the hope
of thwarting the prosecution. Implied graymail describes those attempts by the defense to
obtain or disclose classified information which are simply the exercise of the defendant's
legitimate right to prepare and conduct an adequate defense. In both situations, the Gov-
ernment may be presented with a disclose or dismiss dilemma.
Although this Note focuses only on graymail in the criminal context, the dilemma also
arises in civil litigation. For instance, civil litigation with regard to classified information
has arisen where former governmental employees have published books and articles con-
cerning their experiences in government service. See, e.g., United States v. Marchetti, 466
F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972) (action by United States against
former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee to enjoin him from publishing a pro-
posed book about his experience in government service); United States v. Snepp, 456 F.
Supp. 176 (E.D. Va. 1978), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd,
444 U.S. 507, rehearing denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980) (United States brought a breach of
contract suit against former CIA agent who had written and published a book without first
submitting it to the CIA for prepublication review).
Civil litigation concerning the unauthorized disclosure of classified information also
arises where government officials "leak" information to the press for subsequent publica-
tion. See Espionage Laws and Leaks.- Hearings Before the Subcomm on Legislation of the
House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 69-87, 164-72 (1979)
(statements of Mark Lynch and Thomas I. Emerson) [hereinafter cited as Espionage Laws
and Leaks]; The Use of Class/fed Information in Litigation: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Secrecy and Disclosure of the Senate Select Comm on Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
89-93, 116-24 (1978) (statements of William Colby and Morton H. Halperin) [hereinafter
cited as The Use of Class/ed Information in Litigation].
6. Graymail problems can arise in espionage cases, see, e.g., United States v. Lee,
589 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1979), as well as in cases involving bribery, perjury, obstruction of
justice, narcotics trafficking, and murder, see, eg., United States v. Berrellez, Crim. No.
78-120 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 1979), mandamus denied sub nom. In re United States of America,
No. 78-2158 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 26, 1979) (defendant was charged with multiple counts of
198o]
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protect national security information may create the problem,
since these statutes often require the disclosure of the very infor-
mation which they seek to protect.7 Another major factor generat-
ing this vexing situation is the intelligence agencies' general
reluctance to acquiesce in compromises regarding the disclosure
of classified information, even when the Justice Department re-
quests declassification of the data for use in a prosecution.8 This
unyielding position has immobilized otherwise important investi-
gations and prosecutions.9
The recent Helms' ° and Berrellez" prosecutions, among
others, have forced public attention on the graymail dilemma and
have prompted congressional investigations. 2 These investiga-
perjury and conspiracy). For a discussion of notable graymail cases, see notes 35-70 infra
and accompanying text.
7. For example, section 798 of title 18, which establishes a "strict liability" for the
knowing and willful disclosure of classified information, 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1976), does not
specify whether the prosecution has the burden of establishing the substantive validity of
the classification of the material in order to prosecute under the statute. If the Government
must prove the validity of the classification, it would probably be forced to disclose pub-
licly the very information which the statute is designed to protect. In a comprehensive
article on the espionage statutes, Professors Harold Edgar and Benno Schmidt argue that
requiring the Government to prove proper classification could so compromise national se-
curity interests that imposing sanctions for improper classification would subordinate Gov-
ernment secrecy interests. See Edgar & Schmidt, The Espionage Statutes and Publication of
Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 930, 1066 (1973). For additional discussion of
this problem, see SENATE SUBCOMM. ON SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE, SELECT COMM. ON
INTELLIGENCE, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss., NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS AND THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE 5, 23 (Comm. Print. 1978) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL SECURITY
SECRETS].
Although a consensus is lacking as to whether courts require the prosecution to estab-
lish the propriety of the classification, it is undisputed that the Government in criminal
cases must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the classified information disclosed actu-
ally caused damage to the national security. See Note, United States v. Marchetti andAl-
fred Knopf, Inc. v. Colby. Secrecy 2, First Amendment 0, 3 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1073,
1101 (1976).
8. See NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS, supra note 7, at 3-4; The Use of Classfed
Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 48-51 (statement of Robert Keuch). But see id at
16-23 (statement of Admiral Stansfield Turner).
9. See NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS, supra note 7, at 6-8. For an example of a
prosecution thwarted by the CIA, see notes 35-38 infra and accompanying text.
10. United States v. Helms, Crim. No. 77-650 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 1977) (the Justice De-
partment bypassed a possible perjury prosecution against the former CIA director and in-
stead entered into a plea bargain for a misdemeanor charge of contempt of Congress). See
generally Lacovara, Resolving the "Disclose or Dismiss' Dilemma, Nat'l L.J. May 14, 1979,
at 19, col. 1.
11. United States v. Berrellez, Crim. No. 78-120 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 1979), mandamus
deniedsub nom. In re United States of America, No. 78-2158 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 1979).
12. See NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS, supra note 7, at 1-4; The Use of Classpied
Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 1-9.
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tions have produced various proposals for solution of the di-
lemma, 3 including new statutes, new rules of criminal procedure,
and a revival of a state secrets privilege.'
4
A solution to the graymail dilemma, consistent with constitu-
tional principles, does not appear to be obtainable through the en-
actment of a blanket rule. 5 The precepts of criminal procedure
strongly suggest that elimination of the graymail problem will be
achieved only through a neutral arbiter's balancing of the interests
involved. In light of these concerns, this Note weighs the compet-
ing interests of the prosecution and the defendant within the
graymail context through an examination of various remedies
which are presently available1 6 and proposed congressional re-
forms.' 7 These reforms, initiated by both Houses of Congress, are
designed to create a uniform system of rules'8 for the disclosure of
classified information in pretrial, trial, and appellate proceed-
ings.' 9 The Note explores the advantages and disadvantages of
the present and future graymail solutions and concludes that the
proposed congressional legislation may not present the best means
of correcting the inefficiencies and ambiguities of the present rem-
edies.2" Finally, the Note proposes an alternative to the apparent
congressional intent to codify a distinct set of procedural rules
governing the use of classified information in criminal trials.2 '
13. See NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS, supra note 7, at 30-32; The Use of Classified
Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 2-5.
14. See generally NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS, supra note 7, at 30-32; The Use of
Class/fled Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 56-59.
15. Under the British Official Secrets Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 75, sched. 1, at 492,
if the prosecution declares that the evidence contains information relevant to the security
and protection of the Crown, it is neither required to prove the validity of the classification
nor to disclose the contents of the materials to the defendant. The prosecution does not risk
disclosure because it is permitted to inform the judge in camera (and most likely exparte as
well) that the information is classified without revealing the contents of the information.
Under the British statute, all information relating to government affairs belongs to the
Crown. Under American jurisprudence, however, all information belongs to the people.
The first and sixth amendment guarantees, in particular, would probably render the enact-
ment of a statute comparable to the British Official Secrets Act unconstitutional. U.S.
CONST., amends. I, V1. See also The Use of Class/fled Information in Litigation, supra note
5, at 107 (statement of Lawrence Houston).
16. See notes 71-184 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 185-247 infra and accompanying text.
18. The tools which are presently available for resolving the graymail dilemma are
applied only on an ad hoc basis. See, e.g., Hearings on H. 4736 & H. 4745, supra note
4, at 2-5 (statement of Phillip B. Heymann).
19. See notes 185-247 infra and accompanying text.
20. Id
21. See notes 248-64 infra and accompanying text.
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The proposal incorporates the congressional goals into the existing
rules of evidence and criminal procedure through a series of
amendments as this approach promises a more efficient resolution
of the graymail dilemma.22
I. GRAYMAIL CASES: GRAYMAIL 4, JUSTICE 1
The ordinary criminal prosecution frequently presents a
number of evidentiary difficulties.2 3 These difficulties, however,
are magnified when the evidence to be revealed at trial is classified
information.24 If there is a possibility that prosecution of a de-
fendant will reveal sensitive, classified information during the
course of the trial, the defendant possesses an effective weapon
with which to thwart the prosecution. 25 This graymail weaponry,
while appearing to be novel, has been sporadically used to thwart
government prosecutions since the early days of the nation.26
Only recently has extensive press coverage of several criminal
prosecutions focused public attention on the graymail problem.2 1
One reason for delayed press coverage of graymail is the na-
ture of the problem. Because unsuccessful graymail prosecutions
are rarely publicized by the Government, information relating to
the facts of the incident and the Government's reasons for abort-
ing the prosecution have not been readily available.2" Further-
more, it is not uncommon for a government department to use the
graymail tactic to prevent the Justice Department from even initi-
22. Id
23. See, e.g., State v. Holbert, 416 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Mo. 1967), where the defendant's
conviction for carrying a concealed weapon was reversed because two additional pistols
belonging to the defendant, other than the one charged in the indictment, were introduced
into evidence, and were referred to extensively by the prosecutor, who also passed them to
the jury for examination.
24. See The Use of Classified Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 33 (statement
of Robert Keuch).
25. See NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS, supra note 7, at I 1 n.6.
26. The first criminal defendant to employ the graymail tactic was Aaron Burr, who
sought to serve a subpoena upon the President; Chief Justice Marshall upheld his claim.
See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
27. Lacovara, supra note 10, at 19, col. 1-2.
28. In light of this problem, S. 1482 and H.R. 4736, two of the three bills comprising
the proposed Classified Information Criminal Trial Procedures Act which is presently
under congressional consideration, contain reporting provisions which require the Justice
Department to state its reasons for abandoning a classified information prosecution in a
written report to Congress. See Congressional Record, S. 1482, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12,
125 CONG. REC. S9185 (daily ed. July 11, 1979); id H.R. 4736, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 202,
125 CONG. REC. H5764 (daily ed. July 11, 1979).
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ating a criminal investigation into alleged criminal activity.2 9
Frequently, the primary obstacle to criminal prosecutions in
the classified information context is the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).3" For example, in an unauthorized disclosure in-
vestigation, the Justice Department routinely poses eleven ques-
tions3' to the CIA,32 including one which inquires into the
possibility of declassifying the information for prosecutorial pur-
poses.33  The CIA often refuses to declassify the information,
causing the Justice Department to abandon its investigation.34
This uncooperative attitude is exemplified by the dismissal of
an indictment against a CIA operative, Puttahorn Khramkhruan,
29. A 1978 report by the Senate Subcommittee on Secrecy and Disclosure states that
an intelligence agency reported the details of an intensive Korean government lobbying
effort on Capitol Hill to the Justice Department in 1971. Attempts by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) to investigate the reports were thwarted, however, since the informa-
tion regarding the matter was classified and would not be disclosed to the Bureau. No
further action was taken regarding the Korean affair until 1975. See NATIONAL SECURITY
SECRETS, supra note 7, at 13.
This scenario raises the issue of who should decide whether the national security risk
substantially outweighs the duty of the Justice Department to prosecute. The power to
prosecute and the reciprocal power not to prosecute are vested solely in the Executive
branch of the government, U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3, and in all but the most unusual circum-
stances, this Executive power is exercised by the Attorney General through the Department
of Justice. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 515-516 (1976); accord United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 694 (1974) (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515, 533, the Attorney General dele-
gated authority to represent the United States in the Watergate investigation to a Special
Prosecutor with "unique authority and tenure").
Congress has specifically provided the Attorney General with the authority to investi-
gate violations of the federal criminal code by government employees. 28 U.S.C. § 535(a)
(1976). Because agency directors are required to report "expeditiously" to the Attorney
General any information concerning criminal misconduct by government employees, id
§ 535(b), they are usually not free to decide whether their subordinates should be prose-
cuted for apparent violations of the law. Congress, however, has given the Director of
Central Intelligence the statutory authority to protect intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure. 50 U.S.C. § 403(g) (1976). This responsibility may conflict
with the Attorney General's authority to investigate and prosecute criminal violations if the
prosecution could disclose intelligence sources and methods. NATIONAL SECURITY
SECRETS, supra note 7, at 25. In a 1954 understanding between the Justice Department and
the CIA, the CIA was given the authority to investigate misconduct by its own employees.
Id at 19-20. The CIA has used this authority to effectively block prosecutions by the
Justice Department of both government and nongovernment employees by simply "stone-
wallingt' and refusing to allow the Justice Department access to relevant information. Id
30. The Use of ClassF/ied Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 2-3.
31. For a listing of the questions posed by the Justice Department, see The Use of
Class#fied Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 216.
32. These questions are not posed solely to the CIA; any governmental agency which
possesses the desired information is subject to this inquiry. Id at 44-45, 50-51.
33. Id at 216; NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS, supra note 7, at 7-8.
34. For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see The Use of Classoedlnforma-
tion in Litigation, supra note 5, at 44-46, 50-51.
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who was under investigation by the Justice Department for nar-
cotics trafficking. 35 Khramkhruan had threatened that his defense
would include evidence showing that the CIA knew about his
opium smuggling. 36 Because of this graymail tactic, the CIA in-
formed the Justice Department shortly before trial that it would
neither produce documents necessary for discovery nor provide a
rebuttal witness on the defendant's charge of advance
knowledge.37 CIA officials later testified before the House Sub-
committee on Government Information and Individual Rights
that the Agency based its subsequent request for dismissal of the
indictment on national security grounds.38
The reluctance of the CIA to declassify information for Justice
Department use in criminal prosecutions has often created con-
flicts between the two governmental bodies.3 9 Solutions to this
type of graymail dilemma lie outside the scope of procedural and
evidentiary rules as these cases do not usually result in criminal
prosecutions.40 It has been suggested, however, that stricter ad-
ministrative standards controlling government employees and the
activities of the intelligence agencies should be promulgated to ob-
viate this facet of the graymail threat.4 ' In addition, since the
prosecution of a federal employee may pose conflict of interest
problems for the Justice Department, Congress may want to cre-
ate a special office to conduct all classified information prosecu-
tions of such employees.42 Such remedies may, however, seem
35. NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS, supra note 7, at 14-15.
36. Jenkins, Graymail, Student Law., Dec. 1979, at 16, 19.
37. Id; NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS, supra note 7, at 14.
38. NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS, supra note 7, at 14. According to the testimony of
CIA officials, the CIA had requested the Justice Department to dismiss the indictment
because of its belief that the criminal prosecution would lead to the revelation of sources
and methods of ongoing CIA clandestine operations in Southeast Asia. The witnesses left
unsaid, however, that the CIA would have found it embarrassing to have one of its opera-
tives convicted of narcotics trafficking. Id
39. See NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS, supra note 7, at 3, 6, 7-8; The Use of Classifed
Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 64 (statement of Phillip Lacovara). Contra, id at
11 (where Admiral Stansfield Turner states that relations between the CIA and Justice are
neither strained nor hostile).
40. See notes 34-48 supra and accompanying text.
41. The Use of Classified Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 64, 65-68, 79-80
(statement of Phillip Lacovara).
42. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified
at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 591-598 (West Supp. 1979)), was designed to "preserve and promote the
accountability and integrity of public officials and the institutions of the Federal Govern-
ment and to invigorate the Constitutional separation of powers between the three branches
of Government." S. REP. No. 95-170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4216, 4217. Included within this Act is a provision creating a Special
[Vol. 31:84
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extreme in light of the Government's successful prosecution of a
former CIA employee in United States v. Kampiles.43
During the recent espionage prosecution of William Kampiles,
a former CIA watch officer, the CIA made no effort to thwart the
Justice Department's investigatory efforts.' The defendant in
Kampiles had obtained a copy of the top secret KH-11 System
Technical Manual for the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite while at
work at CIA headquarters.45  During a 1978 trip to Athens,
Kampiles contacted a Russian agent to whom he sold the KH- 11
manual for $3000.46 Returning to the United States, Kampiles ap-
proached a senior CIA official with the details of his alleged
counterintelligence mission, asserting that he had received $3000
"for general expenses." 47 Disbelieving his boast of "something for
nothing," the Government indicted Kampiles on a total of six
counts, including espionage.48
Although espionage prosecutions routinely raise the problem
of graymail,49 the prosecution, with the cooperation of the trial
Prosecutor's Office to prosecute criminal suits involving high government officials. 28
U.S.C.A. § 533 (West Supp. 1979). A Special Prosecutor was deemed necessary to avoid
the serious conflict of interests which would develop if the Department of Justice were to
conduct the investigation and the subsequent prosecution. S. REP. No. 95-170, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 53, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4269.
Notably, the American Civil Liberties Union supported the appointment of a Special
Prosecutor in cases alleging abuses of power by the intelligence agencies and other govern-
ment officials because, in these instances, it was possible that the Justice Department could
not conduct a prosecutorial investigation in an impartial manner. SpecialProsecutor Legis-
lation: Hearings on H 2835 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1978) (statement of Jerry
Berman).
43. United States v. Kampiles, Crim. No. HCR 78-77 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 17, 1978), aj'd,
No. 78-2646, slip op. (7th Cir. Nov. 15, 1979),petition for rehearing denied, No. 78-2646
(7th Cir. Jan. 24, 1980).
44. United States v. Kampiles, No. 78-2646, slip op. at 7 (7th Cir. Nov. 15, 1979).
45. Id at 3-8. As a CIA employee, Kampiles monitored secret cables and spy satellite
photographs. In evaluating these photographs, he used the top secret KH-I I System Tech-
nical Manual for the KH-I1 reconnaissance satellite. Id at 7.
The KH-l 1 satellite is designed to monitor foreign troops and military equipment
movements by photographing them from outer space; the KH-1I manual reveals the limi-
tations on the satellite's geographic coverage and also contains examples of the quality of
the satellite's photographs. If the information contained within the manual were given to
the Soviet Union, arguably they could develop effective camouflage to avoid the satellite's
surveillance, thus reducing the effectiveness of this reconnaissance equipment. Wash. Post,
Nov. 14, 1978, § A, at 6, col. 3.
46. United States v. Kampiles, No. 78-2646, slip op. at 4-6 (7th Cir. Nov. 15, 1979).
47. Id at 5.
48. Id at 1-3.
49. According to a United States intelligence source, "[O]ne of the problems [with an
espionage prosecution] is that in order to prosecute we might just have to release classified
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judge, successfully proved its case against Kampiles by introduc-
ing edited versions of the KH-11 manual at trial.50 Kampiles was
subsequently found guilty on all six counts and received a forty
year sentence.5
United States v. Kampiles52 is one instance where judicial co-
operation avoided the graymail dilemma. The prosecution of
Kampiles, however, seems to represent the exception rather than
the rule. In light of the unsuccessful prosecution of former CIA
director Richard Helms,5 3 Kampiles suggests that graymail under-
mines criminal prosecution only when high level officials are in-
volved.
Richard Helms, like William Kampiles, was a CIA employee,
but their similarity ends there. Purportedly, Helms used his posi-
tion as a former director of the agency to graymail the Justice De-
partment into dropping the prosecution against him on several
perjury counts by threatening to introduce into evidence classified
information and details of CIA practices. 4 The Justice Depart-
ment delayed prosecuting Helms for almost two years. Finally, in
1977, it dropped the perjury counts, each with a maximum penalty
of a five year sentence and a $2000 fine, and allowed Helms to
plead nolo contendere to a two-count misdemeanor, because he
"did refuse and fail to answer questions" before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee on two occasions. 5 Through his plea,
Helms managed to avoid the stigma of an admission of guilt and
he received only a $2000 fine and one year of unsupervised proba-
tion.56
The Helms case produced a flagrant miscarriage of justice
when viewed in light of the elements necessary to prove perjury.
The only classified information required to be disclosed at trial
would be evidence tending to show that perjury was committed.57
information, and we just can't do that." Wash. Post, Aug. 20, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 3. See
generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 794, 798 (1976) (standard of proof under these espionage statutes
often requires the disclosure of the contents of the classified document at issue).
50. Espionage Laws and Leaks, supra note 5, at 18-19.
51. United States v. Kampiles, No. 78-2646, slip op. at 3 (7th Cir. Nov. 15, 1979);
Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 1978, § A, at 10, col. 5.
52. United States v. Kampiles, No. 78-2646 (7th Cir. Nov. 15, 1979),petition for re-
hearing denied, No. 78-2646 (7th Cir. Jan. 24, 1980).
53. United States v. Helms, Crim. No. 77-650 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 1977).
54. Jenkins, supra note 36, at 18.
55. Lacovara, supra note 10, at 19, col. 1.
56. Jenkins, supra note 36, at 18.
57. The Use of Class~fed Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 118 (statement of
Morton H. Halperin).
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Any classified information not relevant to this element of the of-
fense is irrelevant to the other aspects of the prosecution's case-in-
chief, and probably to any part of the defense as well. Accord-
ingly, since the alleged perjury committed by Helms had already
been made public, 8 his prosecution should not have forced the
revelation of substantial amounts of national security information.
A result such as this leads to criticism that the Government uses
graymail as a convenient excuse to avoid prosecuting one of its
own, and thereby conceal embarrassing details of misconduct by
government officials. 9
The recent International Telegraph and Telephone (ITT)
cases60 also raise this concern and illustrate the need for a uniform
approach to the graymail problems. In connection with testimony
given before a Senate subcommittee in 1973 regarding ITT's role
in the 1970 Chilean presidential election, the Justice Department
indicted two ITT officials, Robert Berrellez and Edward J. Ger-
rity, Jr., on counts of perjury and conspiracy.6' As a result of the
corporation's relationship with the CIA's activities in Chile, crimi-
nal prosecutions of the ITT officials threatened to reveal sensitive
information during trial.62 Consequently, the Justice Department
sought to obtain a protective order from the district court judge as
it had done in Kampiles. 63 Although it obtained an order re-
straining the defense from making unauthorized disclosures of
CIA documents provided to them through pretrial discovery, 6 the
trial judge refused to issue a protective order establishing a pre-
trial framework for advance rulings on classified information is-
sues.
65
Attempting to overturn the judge's ruling, the Justice Depart-
58. Id
59. Jenkins, supra note 36, at 43.
60. The two ITT cases are United States v. Berrellez, Crim. No. 78-120 (D.D.C. Feb.
8, 1978), mandamus denied sub nom In re United States of America, No. 78-2158 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 26, 1979), and United States v. Gerrity, Crim. No. 78-121 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 1978).
See Jenkins, supra note 36, at 19; Lacovara, supra note 10, at 19, col. 1.
61. Berrellez and Gerrity were charged with giving false testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. Lacovara,
supra note 10, at 19, col. 1; Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 4-5. The ITT officials
were alleged to have falsely testified that ITT neither offered financial aid to the political
opponents of socialist Salvadore Allende nor collaborated with the CIA in attempting to
prevent Allende's election as president. Id col. 5.
62. Lacovara, supra note 10, at 19, col. 1.
63. Id
64. Id
65. Id Judge Robinson described the Government's request as "an unusual, ex-
traordinary, unprecedented procedure to make an ordinary judgment about the relevance
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ment sought a writ of mandamus from the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, arguing that the appellate
court should use its supervisory powers to establish the desired
pretrial procedures for cases like Berrellez, in which national se-
curity was likely to be compromised by the disclosure of certain
secret information.66 The court of appeals, however, denied the
petition for mandamus.67 Subsequently, the Justice Department
dismissed the charges against both Berrellez and Gerrity because
the threatened disclosure of national security information pre-
vented further prosecution.68
Not only do the ITT cases support the demand for new classi-
fied information procedures, they also create the image of the Jus-
tice Department as a willing victim in the graymail ploy: the
classified information which prevented the prosecution was actu-
ally irrelevant to both the prosecution and the defense.69 More-
over, since the perjury committed by Berrellez and Gerrity was
publicly reported, it is questionable whether additional classified
information would have been revealed as a result of the prosecu-
tions.7° Thus, considering the nature of the evidence necessary to
prove perjury, it is possible that public trials of Berrellez and Ger-
rity could have followed the Kampiles pattern.
In Kampiles, the redaction procedure and the rules of evidence
formed a successful means for counteracting the graymail ploy.
These identical procedures, however, were insufficient to achieve
the same results in the ITT cases when corporate officials were
involved. It is possible that public trials of the ITT officials would
have revealed highly classified information concerning CIA oper-
ations in Chile. It must be noted, however, that the ITT result
adds to the evolving pattern of prosecutorial immunity for high
level officials and prosecution of those in positions of less power
and authority.
of proffered testimony; [and for which he possessed not] one iota of authority for any of the
propositions that have been proposed by the Government." Jenkins, supra note 36, at 19.
66. Id
67. United States v. Berrellez, Crim. No. 78-120 (D.D.C. 1978), mandamus deniedsub
nom. In re United States of America, No. 78-2158 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The appellate court
explained that "the extraordinary remedy of mandamus is rarely available to the govern-
ment to obtain review of pretrial orders in criminal cases," and thus, held that the district
judge had not exceeded his authority in rejecting the novel procedures pressed upon him
by the prosecutors. Lacovara, supra note 10, at 19, col. 1.
68. Lacovara, supra note 10, at 19, col. 1; Jenkins, supra note 36, at 19.
69. See The Use of Classofed lnformation in Litigation, supra note 5, at 118 (statement
of Morton H. Halperin).
70. Id
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The prosecutions of Kampiles, Helms, Berrellez, and Gerrity
demonstrate the need for a more effective application of presently
available substantive and procedural devices to handle the litiga-
tion problems presented by classified information. The erratic
success record of the Justice Department in this context, however,
indicates that present mechanisms create a legal vacuum more
often than they successfully eliminate the graymail dilemma. -Ac-
cordingly, this Note next examines the advantages and disadvan-
tages of several substantive and procedural devices which are
presently available to solve the graymail dilemma.
II. SOLVING THE GRAYMAIL DILEMMA WITH PRESENTLY
AVAILABLE REMEDIES
Successful use of the graymail tactic not only forces the Gov-
ernment to abandon criminal prosecutions, but it also undermines
the integrity of the criminal justice system7 and reinforces public
opinion that those individuals with access to sensitive information
enjoy a broad de facto immunity from prosecution. 2 Therefore,
much attention has been focused on finding a solution to the
graymail dilemma. One suggestion is that a formal mechanism is
needed to weigh the risks of disclosure against the benefits of pros-
ecution and to avoid the creation of frustrating impasses which
often lead to the abandonment of prosecutions.7 3 A uniform ap-
proach would also be more likely to ensure a consistent applica-
tion of those statutes and rules already designed to solve the
graymail dilemma. Congressional codification of uniform, unam-
biguous provisions is thus imperative. The issue to be resolved,
however, is how comprehensive the mechanism must be in order
to enable the Justice Department to prosecute those individuals
with access to classified information who break the law while pre-
serving the defendant's constitutional rights to a public and fair
71. Testifying before the House Subcommittee on Legislation of the Permanent Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence on January 25, 1979, Senator Joseph Biden remarked:
The "graymair' phenomenon also tears at the fabric of our system of justice by
creating an atmosphere of contempt for that system among those in contact with
it. Try explaining to a man doing twenty years to life for an economic crime why
another man or woman who compromised the freedom and security of the entire
Nation and its citizenry is not prosecuted or is allowed to enter a plea bargain
with knowledge that his sentence, if any at all, will be suspended. [N]one of us
comprehend [unequal justice] nearly as well as the man doing twenty years to life.
Espionage Laws and Leaks, supra note 5, at 90 (statement of Senator Joseph Biden).
72. Hearings on H.A 4736 & H.A 4745, supra note 4, at 3-5 (statement of Phillip B.
Heymann).
73. Id
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trial as guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Before discussing
this issue, however, it is necessary to examine the mechanisms
presently available to combat the "disclose or dismiss" dilemma.
A. The Espionage Laws
Placing one's means of access to defense or other national se-
curity secrets at the disposal of foreign governments or factions
constitutes the offense of espionage.74 Since the purpose of espio-
nage statutes is to prevent disclosure of certain information, it is
possible that they could be used to defuse the graymail threat.
Drafting statutes to prevent espionage and its product-the unau-
thorized disclosure of information pertaining to military affairs,
foreign policy, and national security-is a difficult task. The stat-
ute must encompass the classic case of spying, while balancing
several competing interests. For example, a comprehensive espio-
nage statute must balance the need to disclose relevant informa-
tion so that the public may exercise its franchise75 against the need
to withhold information which, if disclosed, could be harmful to
national security.76
The language of the current espionage statutes77 creates
problems of interpretation regarding the specific conduct prohib-
74. Espionage Laws and Leaks supra note 5, at 112 (statement of Harold Edgar and
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.).
75. The democratic form ofgovernment inherently conflicts with the need for secrecy.
Without an independent source of information, Congress must either rely on those with
access to the secrets or exercise its power blindly. Consequently, as the scope of privileged
information increases, the ability of the public, through its elected representatives, to make
and express a meaningful opinion decreases. Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN.
L. REv. 875, 878-79 (1966).
76. Espionage Laws and Leaks, supra note 5, at 108. In addition, such a comprehen-
sive statute must attempt to resolve the problems associated with governmental employee
infidelity, executive rights and duties regarding top secret information and the rights and
duties of a free press. Id
77. The current espionage statutes are scattered throughout titles 18 and 50 of the
United States Code; however, the primary provisions are contained in sections 793 through
798 of title 18. Subsections 793(a), 793(b), and 794(a) of title 18 together make the gather-
ing and communication of information relating to the national defense a crime if such acts
are done with either an "intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the
injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation. ... 18 U.S.C.
§ 793(a) (1976).
Similarly, subsection 794(b) prohibits publishing or otherwise communicating national
security information during wartime with an intent to make such information available to
the enemy, 18 U.S.C. § 794(b) (1976), and subsections 793(d) and 793(e) prohibit both the
"willful" communication of national security information and documents to persons "not
entitled to receive it" and the unlawful retention of this information by those same persons.
18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d)-793(e) (1976). For a comprehensive study of the espionage laws, see
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 7.
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ited, the precise limits on the scope of the statutes, and the stan-
dards of culpability and intent. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 793(a)
prohibits the gathering of national security information if the act
is done with the "intent or reason to believe that the information
is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage
of any foreign nation."78 This section seems to be applicable to a
reporter who gathers national security information for publication
in the interests of informed national debate. Moreover, the publi-
cation of such information by the reporter's newspaper may be an
offense under subsection 793(e)79 if done with "reason to believe"
that a foreign government will benefit.8"
The possibility that newspaper publication is included within
the definition of the crime is strengthened by the absence of an
intent requirement in subsection 793(e)."1 Unlike the other sub-
sections of the statute, this provision does not expressly require
that an actor be motivated by an intent to injure the United States
or benefit a foreign country; it requires only an awareness of the
significance of the information. 2 Therefore, a newspaper which
published classified information would be culpable under this
subsection if it was merely aware of the classified nature of the
78. 18 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1976).
79. Section 793(e) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any docu-
ment,. . . relating to the national defense. . . which information the possessor
has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or
causes to be communicated... or- attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or
cause to be communicated, delivered or transmitted the same to any person not
entitled to receive it or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the
officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it. . . [s]hall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (1976).
80. Id
81. Id The statutory language indicates that any "communicating" of national secur-
ity information to unauthorized personnel constitutes a criminal offense. If this interpreta-
tion is correct, "[tihe source who leaks defense information to the press commits an offense;
the reporter who holds onto defense materials commits an offense; and the retired official
who uses defense material in his memoirs commits an offense." Edgar & Schmidt, supra
note 7, at 1000. Thus, "public speech in this country since World War II has been rife with
criminality." Id
82. See, e.g., United States v. Coplon, 88 F. Supp. 910,911-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), where
the trial court construed subsection 793(d) to require a lesser intent than subsection 793(b);
thereby making a violation of both subsections separate and distinct offenses. According to
the court, subsection 793(d) required merely that the defendant had obtained possession of
the documents and had attempted to transmit them to another who was not entitled to
receive them. Id Section 793(d) is virtually identical to section 793(e): the former covers
those actors with lawful possession of national security documents and the latter covers
those with unauthorized possession.
19801
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information. The legislative history of these provisions, however,
indicates that Congress did not intend to include newspaper publi-
cation within the definition of the crime.83 It is unclear precisely
how the broad implication inherent in these provisions is to be
narrowed in order to effectuate this congressional intent. 84
Subsection 793(c) is another example of espionage legislation
which, if interpreted literally, would subject a considerable range
of conduct relating to public debate to criminal sanctions.8 Lia-
bility under this subsection depends upon the interpretation of the
phrase "for the purpose aforesaid." 6 It may mean that simply
obtaining national security information, irrespective of the actor's
intent, constitutes the criminal offense, or, alternatively, it may
mean that the actor must obtain the information with an "intent
or reason to believe that the information will be used to the injury
of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation. 87
The absence of any language which would constitute an intent re-
quirement indicates that the purpose of obtaining national secur-
ity information constitutes the crime.88 This construction would
permit a conviction regardless of the actor's intent to harm the
United States.89
Although support for this interpretation of subsection (c) is
provided by the statute's structure, some congressional drafters
apparently did not intend such a cnstruction.9 ° Both law enforce-
ment authorities and Congress have assumed that the identical
culpability standard required for a violation of subsections 793(a)
and (b), which specify an intent requirement, is also required for a
83. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 7, at 1000, 1030.
84. Id at 998-99, 1032.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 793(c) (1976). This subsection provides in part:
Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or attempts
to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source whatever, any docu-
ment, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative,
blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note, of anything con-
nected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to believe, at the time
he receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain it, that it has been
or will be obtained, taken, made, or disposed of by any person contrary to the
provisions of this chapter. . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both.
Id
86. This phrase refers to the purpose prohibited by subsection 793(a), that is, ob-
taining classified information.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1976).
88. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 7, at 1059.
89. Id
90. See 54 CONG. REc. 2820 (1917); 55 CONG. REC. 778 (1917).
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violation of subsection (c).9'
In addition to the classic espionage provisions, Congress also
enacted other statutes which prohibit the disclosure of certain cat-
egories of classified information92 as well as the disclosure of such
information between particular classes of persons.93 Because
these statutes are narower in their scope, they may represent more
precise congressional drafting. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 798,
which prohibits the disclosure of cryptographic information, spe-
cifically states that a violation occurs upon participation in the
proscribed conduct, regardless of the actor's motivation.94
One significant problem which section 798 does not cover is
whether improper classification constitutes a defense.95 The Sen-
ate and House Judiciary Committees reported that "[tihe bill spec-
ifies that the classification must in fact be in the interests of
national security," 96 indicating that appropriateness of classifica-
tion is a question of fact.97
Section 798 presents a difficult problem: it appears to require
the disclosure during a criminal trial of cryptographic documents
which the Government is trying to keep secret. In addition, the
91. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 7, at 1059, 1076-77. Ironically, in light of this confu-
sion regarding the culpability standards, Justice Reed unequivocally asserted in Gorin v.
United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1940), that the vagueness of this statutory language was irrele-
vant because scienter was required. Justice Reed stated:
We find no uncertainty in this statute which depriives a person of the ability to
predetermine whether a contemplated action is criminal under the provisions of
this law. The obvious delimiting words in the statute . . . requiring "intent or
reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used to the injury of
the United States or to the advantage of any foreign government" . . . requires
those prosecuted to have acted in bad faith. The sanctions only apply when scien-
ter is established.
Id at 27-28 (emphasis in original).
92. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1976) (prohibiting the revelation of communications
intelligence and cryptographic information).
93. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 952 (1976) (prohibiting the disclosure of diplomatic codes
and correspondence in this country); 50 U.S.C. § 783(b) (1976) (prohibiting federal em-
ployees from divulging classified information to an agent of a foreign government or a
member of a designated Communist organization).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1976).
95. See note 2 supra for a definition of "classified information" pursuant to Executive
Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949 (1978). See also 18 U.S.C. § 798(b) (1976).
96. S. REP. No. 111, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949); H. REP. No. 1895, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1950).
97. But see Scarbeck v. United States, 317 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 856 (1963) (refusing to allow a defense of improper classification under 50 U.S.C.
§ 783(b) (1976), a statute which bars government employees from communicating classified
information to an agent or representative of a foreign government). A principal argument
against allowing the improper classification defense is that it requires the Government to
disclose an enormous amount of information to prove its case-in-chief.
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statute provides an exception for the disclosure of classified infor-
mation other than that classified expressly for intelligence com-
munication purposes.9" Conceivably, therefore, disclosure of
classified information which is outside the purview of section 798
would not invoke that section's penalties. 99
The current espionage laws attempt to treat a wide variety of
problems: classic spying, government employee breaches of offi-
cial secrecy orders, and newspaper publication. The resulting mo-
rass demonstrates the difficulty of prohibiting all forms of
classified information disclosure in a single statutory provision.
For example, sections 793 and 794 encompass the disclosure of all
national security information by anyone, while distinguishing be-
tween actual spying and well intentioned publication through
cumbersome and opaque descriptions of the actor's mental
state. 00 Prohibitions thus result which either leave publication
without restraint, or subject it to sweeping prohibitions which may
be appropriate to spying, but inappropriate to informed debate
regarding national policy. It appears, therefore, that espionage
statutes are ill-suited to control graymail threats.
B. Relevance to the Defense: Excluding Classjfed Information
Evidence from the Trial
Although the graymail dilemma is most commonly found in
espionage prosecutions, it may also occur in criminal prosecutions
involving narcotics, extortion, obstruction of justice, perjury, and
even murder--crimes which are generally not associated with na-
tional security risks.' 0 ' Criminal statutes applicable to these
nonespionage prosecutions, therefore, do not specifically provide
for the disclosure of classified information during the course of the
litigation. Absent such specific statutory provisions, the prosecu-
tion can, in some instances, rely on the general principles of the
rules of evidence to counterbalance the graymail threat. For ex-
ample, one possible key to averting the-"disclose or dismiss" di-
lemma is the irrelevance of the classified information to the issues
in the case.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1976).
99. See The Use of Class/fed Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 77-78 (state-
ment of Philip Lacovara). A violation of section 798 is subject to a maximum prison term
of ten years, a $10,000 fine, or both.
100. Espionage Laws and Leaks, supra note 5, at Ill (statement of Harold Edgar &
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.).
101. See NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS, supra note 7, at 12.
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1. Rules of Relevance
Where the classified information is irrelevant to the material
issues in the case, disclosure of the sensitive information can be
avoided.'0 2 Therefore, unless the classified information which a
defendant hopes to introduce at trial is relevant to his or her de-
fense, it is not admissible and the prosecution cannot be com-
pelled to disclose the classified data. 103 If the prosecution insists
upon this precise interpretation of relevance, it can successfully
quash the defendant's graymail threat, as demonstrated by United
States v. Ehrlichman.104
Before the return of the indictment in Ehrlichman, defense
counsel warned the prosecution that it would force the most high-
ly classified information regarding national security into the pub-
lic record.0 5 The Watergate Special Prosecutor, however, refused
to dismiss the proceedings. Rather than concede to defense
threats, he sought ways to neutralize the defense strategy. 10 6
Eventually, an indictment against the defendants was returned.
Subsequently, the defendants attempted to make good their
threat and demanded the production of highly classified data, in-
cluding nuclear missile targeting plans. 0 7 The defendants sought
102. The Federal Rules of Evidence define "relevant evidence" as "evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED.
R. EvID. 401.
Relevance, however, is not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence. Rather, it
exists only as a relation between a piece of evidence and a matter properly provable in the
case. Whether this relationship exists, depends upon the tenets evolved by science or expe-
rience which are applied logically to the instant matter. Advisory Committee's Explanatory
Statement Concerning the Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183, 216-18 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Advisory Committee's Notes].
The Federal Rules of Evidence state: "Evidence which is not relevant is not admissi-
ble." FED. R. EVID. 402. This provision, as well as the provision that all relevant evidence,
with certain exceptions, is admissible, is "a presupposition involved in the very conception
of a rational system of evidence." Advisory Committee's Notes, supra, at 216-17 (citing J.
THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 264 (1898)). Similar provisions are found
in CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 350-351 (West 1977). See also UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 7(f);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-407(0 (Weeks 1965); N.J. R. EVID. 7(f). These rules provide that
all relevant evidence is admissible, and thus leave to implication the exclusion of irrelevant
evidence.
103. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 402; Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 102, at
215-17.
104. 376 F. Supp. 29 (D.D.C. 1974), afd, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1120 (1977) (prosecution resulting from the break-in at the office of Daniel Ells-
berg's psychiatrist).
105. See The Use of Class#Fed Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 55.
106. Id
107. Id See also United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d at 930-32.
19so]
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to obtain national security information to support the defense that
they believed the break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychi-
atrist was fully justified by national security concerns.10 8 The Spe-
cial Prosecutor argued, however, that such information was
irrelevant to the charge of conspiracy to violate fourth amendment
rights because "good faith" motivation was not a valid defense to
this crime. 109 Both the district court and the court of appeals
agreed with the Special Prosecutor."10 Consequently, the difficult
choice between disclosing classified information vital to national
security needs and forfeiting an important prosecution was
avoided.
The Ellsberg break-in case represents one incident where the
rules of relevance successfully thwarted the defendant's attempt to
graymail the prosecution. The recent cases in which the Justice
Department attempted to prosecute two ITT officials for perjury
and conspiracy"' and the attempted prosecution of former CIA
director Richard Helms" 2 represent examples of other situations
which presented the risk of disclosing classified information at
public trial. Unlike Ehrlichman, however, these prosecutions were
subverted by the defendants' successful use of the graymail tac-
tic.' 13
Whether the rules of relevance could have actually prevented
graymail in these cases is pure speculation. The procedure em-
ployed by the Special Prosecutor in Ehrlichman, however, should
work well in perjury or conspiracy cases, particularly where the
defendant seeks to introduce classified information to show good
faith motivation, since motive is irrelevant to the material issue in
these crimes. "4 In these cases, the classified information is rele-
vant only to the extent it proves that the crime indeed was com-
mitted." 5 Beyond this purpose, the classified information is
108. 546 F.2d at 917-18.
109. Id at 918-19.
110. See The Use of Classoed Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 55.
111. See notes 60-70 supra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 53-59 supra and accompanying text.
113. The exact relation of the classified information to the defense in these cases is
unknown. Sources simply indicate that the Government feared the public disclosure of
highly classified information if these cases went to trial. See generally Jenkins, supra note
36, at 18-19; Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 3; id at 12, col. 2.
114. See notes 65-70 supra and accompanying text.
115. Testifying before the House Subcommittee on Legislation, former general counsel
to the Special Prosecutor, Phillip Lacovara postulated:
[11n a perjury case, it is highly doubtful that the defendant is entitled to introduce
background information of a highly classified nature designed to show what his
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irrelevant to both the defense and the proof of the case. There-
fore, the defendant should be unable to compromise national se-
curity by threatening to introduce the information as evidence at
trial.
Although the rules of relevance may help to undercut the
graymail threat in certain cases, the rules may also be advanta-
geous to the defendant if the classified information in question is
determined to be relevant and admissible as evidence at trial.' 16
A principal drawback to relying on the rules of relevance, how-
ever, is that the rules normally become operative when the oppos-
ing party offers the classified evidence at trial. Because of the
sensitive nature of some classified information, the prosecution
often prefers to avoid the possibility of disclosure at trial by liti-
gating the issue of relevance in camera, or even before the trial
begins.
2. The In Camera Hearing
The in camera hearing provides for judicial determination of
the admissibility of evidence outside the public courtroom, and
presents an opportunity for the prosecution to prevent public dis-
semination of classified materials. Greater use of the in camera
proceeding would enable the court to determine the relevance of
the classified information in question to the issues without risking
the disclosure of sensitive information in open court. 17
Conceptually, however, the in camera proceeding directly con-
false answers were designed to conceal. Motive is simply not a material issue in
the case, and the classified information is not relevant at the trial.
See The Use of Classified Information in Litigation, Supra note 5, at 55.
The proposed federal Criminal Code expressly recognizes this proposition. Subsection
1345(d) precludes a defense in a false statements prosecution that, in a closed congressional
session, a false answer was necessary "to prevent the disclosure of classified information or
to protect the national defense." S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1345(d) (1978).
Notably, specific intent crimes, such as perjury or conspiracy, do not acknowledge the
good faith defense of motive. See, eg., United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d at 918-19.
116. Not all relevant evidence is admissible at trial. Under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, relevant evidence is excluded where the probative value of such evidence is "sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
117. An in camera adversary proceeding enables both parties to present their argu-
ments to the presiding judge. During the proceeding, the parties are subject to judicial
controls, such as the threat of contempt, to prevent them from disclosing the classified
information to the public. The in camera adversary hearing thus protects both the secrecy
of the materials and the defendant's right to prepare an adequate defense. See The Use of
Classffied Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 99-100, 102-03.
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flicts with the sixth amendment's express guarantee of a public
trial for the accused," I8 although courts have long recognized that
a defendant's right to a public trial and his or her right to be pres-
ent at all hearings are not absolute. 19 In recognition of the com-
peting interests at stake, the Supreme Court has indicated that a
court may properly determine in an in camera, exparte proceed-
ing whether electronic surveillance conducted for national secur-
ity purposes was lawful. 120  The in camera, exparte proceeding
has also been held to be a permissible means of determining
whether the defendant has standing to challenge the constitution-
ality of the electronic surveillance 12 1 and whether the electronic
surveillance material sought by the defendant during discovery is
relevant. 22
Using the in camera proceeding in cases involving classified
information allows the courts to protect both the national security
interests and the defendant's interest in a fair trial.' 23 Acting in
camera, judges can decide preliminary issues, such as discovery
requests and the relevance of evidence, without risking general
public dissemination of the classified information. 124 The in cam-
118. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. On its face, the in camera hearing appears to contradict
the right to a public hearing, since the in camera hearing is actually a secret hearing.
119. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (trial judge may exclude defendant
from courtroom if defendant's behavior is disruptive); United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481
F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973) (protection of the government's secret "hijacker's profile" justifies
exclusion of defendant and public from the courtroom); Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d
Cir. 1969) (exclusion of public justified to preserve truthful testimony of witness); United
States ex rel Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965) (exclusion of public justified
where its presence disrupted the trial). See generally Note, The Right to a Public Trial in
Criminal Cases, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1138 (1966); Note, TheAccused's Right to a Public Trial,
42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 499 (1967).
120. See, e.g., Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 314 (1969) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring).
121. See, e.g., Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316, 317-18 (1969) (per curiam).
122. See, e.g., United States ex rel Williams v. Dutton, 431 F.2d 70, 71 (5th Cir. 1970).
But see Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 875 (1966) (trial judge's function is limited
to protective orders where national security is concerned); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S.
657, 669 (1957) (practice of producing government documents to the trial judge for a deter-
mination of their relevancy and materiality without a hearing by the accused is disap-
proved).
123. In camera examinations in which the court sought to balance the Government's
interest in secrecy against the defendant's interest in disclosure have been upheld by the
Supreme Court in various contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-15
(1974) (disclosure of tapes allegedly containing confidential Presidential communications);
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966) (disclosure of grand jury minutes subject to in
camera deletions of extraneous material); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957)
(disclosure of informant's identity).
124. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld this approach in
United States v. Bass, 472 F.2d 207 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973), a criminal
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era hearing combined with the issuance of a protective order fur-
ther undercuts the graymail threat in these cases, since the judge
determines the admissibility of the information prior to trial and
without its disclosure to the jury and the public.125
The in camera hearing, however, does present some significant
disadvantages.126 Extensive use of this special courtroom tech-
nique could be costly, and constant retreat to the judge's chambers
could disrupt the trial.'2 7 Furthermore, use of the in camera pro-
cedure may surprise the prosecution as it does not provide it with
advance notice of the defendant's intent to raise the classified in-
formation issue. The in camera hearing also raises issues regard-
ing the proper role of the court. In determining the admissibility
of classified information, the judge essentially decides the appro-
priateness of the classification. Consequently, a substantial con-
troversy has arisen between officials of the executive branch and
the judiciaryI28 regarding the deference which a court should give
prosecution in which a subcontractor was charged with making fraudulent statements re-
garding parts he supplied to an Air Force contractor. The appeals court approved the trial
court's in camera inspection of the contract to determine whether confidential military in-
formation in the contract, which the Government had deleted, was exculpatory or other-
wise relevant to trial. 472 F.2d at 211. Contra, Zagel, supra note 75 (where the author
argues that the use of the in camera hearing increases the risk of disclosure).
125. See, eg., United States v. Gray, Crim. No. 78-00179 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 1978) (pro-
tective order provided for the redaction of documents by the Government prior to discov-
ery by the defendants).
126. Zagel, supra note 75, at 886-87.
127. Id
128. A determination of the propriety of the classification must be made by either the
Executive or the courts. The Executive initially decides the validity of the privilege under-
lying the classification designation when he or she orders the materials to remain undis-
closed in accordance with Executive Order No. 12,065. See notes 2-3 supra. Due to this
initial involvement with the classification, it is argued that the Executive should not deter-
mine the appropriateness of the classification.
A better approach would be to allow the judiciary to determine the validity of the
requested privilege, although it is argued that there are some national secrets that even a
judge should not see. Many intimate operations of the nation, however, are disclosed regu-
larly to Congress in executive sessions. Allowing a judge in the privacy of his or her cham-
bers to examine classified information certainly appears to present less danger of
disclosure. See Zagel, supra note 75, at 886. In light of the apparent overclassification of
much government information, the objectivity of a third party, such as that of a judge, is
greatly needed. See The Use of Classfedlnformation in Litigation, supra note 5, at 54-55.
Courts have held that the disclosure of "evidence relevant to the issues in [the case]
involves a justiciable question, traditionally within the competence of the [judiciary]."
Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 187, 197 (3d Cir.), rev'don other grounds, 345 U.S. 1
(1953). Recently, in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the Supreme Court indi-
cated that the trial judge should make the initial determination of relevance regarding the
classified materials. Id at 714-15.
One possible judicial solution to this controversy was outlined by the majority of the
United States Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Grunden, 2 MJ. 116 (1977),
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to the Executive classification scheme. 29 In light of the disadvan-
tages and the uncertainty which surround the judiciary's role in
this area, employing the in camera proceeding in limine may pres-
ent a preferable means of confronting the "disclose or dismiss"
dilemma.
3. The Pretrial Motion to Exclude: The Motion In Limine
Traditional Anglo-American evidentiary principles permit
objections to evidence only at trial.'13  Adhering to this tradition,
some courts have refused to recognize the legitimacy of a pretrial
motion to exclude, holding that "there is no occasion, prior to
trial, to seek test rulings. . . upon questions of admissibility."''
Determining the admissibility of evidence in open court, how-
ever, allows the jury to become aware that potentially damaging
evidence may exist. While a limiting instruction to the jury con-
cerning the inadmissible evidence may preclude any legal error, it
probably cannot reverse the psychological impact of the evidence
on the jury. 32 Thus, the motion in limine, a pretrial motion to
exclude, has been employed to minimize the impact of prejudicial
evidence upon the jury. 33
In essence, the motion in limine is a pretrial request for an or-
der directing the opposing party and counsel, as well as witnesses,
to refrain from introducing certain prejudicial evidence, either di-
rectly or indirectly, without a prior determination of its admissi-
bility outside the presence of the jury.134  A motion in limine
reprintedin The Use of Classified Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 196-219. Under
Grunden, whenever the disclosure of classified information is protested by the Govern-
ment, the judge's initial task is to determine whether the material at issue has been classi-
fied by the proper authorities in accordance with the appropriate regulations. 2 M.J. at
122-23.
129. For a summary of the Executive classification scheme, see note 2 supra.
130. Comment, Motion in Limine, 29 ARK. L. REV. 215, 217 (1975). See also Note,
Pretrial Exclusionary Evidence Rulings, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 738, 745-46.
131. Note, supra note 130, at 746. See, e.g., Bradford v. Birmingham Elec. Co., 227
Ala. 285, 149 So. 729 (1933) (holding that a pretrial motion to exclude violates all precedent
and such a motion has no authorization under Alabama law). An increasing number of
courts, however, have recognized the legitimacy of pretrial exclusionary rulings. See Da-
vis, Motions in Limine, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 255, 257 (1966).
132. Comment, Motions in Limine in Washington, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 780 (1975).
133. Comment, supra note 130, at 133. Black's Law Dictionary defines "in limine" as:
"On or at the threshold; at the very beginning; preliminarily." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
896 (5th ed. rev. 1979).
134. Comment, supra note 130, at 217. The motion in limine can be used by either the
defendant or the prosecution. Id See also Rothblatt & Leroy, The Motion in Limine in
Criminal Trials, 60 Ky. L.J. 611 (1972).
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should be distinguished from hearings on preliminary questions of
fact 35 and from pretrial motions seeking to exclude illegally ob-
tained evidence.136 A true motion in limine seeks a judicial ruling
that the potentially prejudicial character of a specific item of evi-
dence outweighs any materiality the evidence could have at
trial. 137
Generally, the decision of whether to make an advance ruling
is left to the trial judge's discretion.' 38 The trial judge's authority
to render pretrial exclusionary rulings on the basis of a motion in
limine is derived from the duty to ensure a fair trial to all par-
ties.' 39 Most judges, however, are reluctant to make pretrial rul-
ings, especially when the motion in limine is sanctioned by neither
statute nor law.' 4
0
There are two types of motions in limine. The first, an absolute
motion in limine, completely prohibits the opposing party from of-
fering or mentioning the offending evidence at the trial. This ab-
solute order is issued before trial and remains in effect throughout
the entire proceeding. 1
41
The second type of motion in limine, the preliminary order,
finds greater acceptance in the American legal system.' 42 The pre-
liminary order is preferred by many trial judges because it does
not obstruct the "natural course of the trial."'143 The preliminary
order requires the submission of prejudicial evidence to the trial
judge outside of the jury's presence before it is introduced at trial.
The admissibility of the profferred evidence is determined while
the trial is in progress, but before the evidence is presented to the
135. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 53 (2d ed.
1972).
136. The motion in limine is distinguishable from the motion to suppress in that the
former is discretionary, balancing the relevance of the evidence against the prejudice it
creates, while the latter is grounded in fourth and fifth amendment guarantees. Id § 180.
137. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 134, at 613-14.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270, 273-74 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 947 (1969).
139. 401 F.2d at 272-73.
140. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 134, at 616.
141. Due to this definitive characteristic, many trial judges are reluctant to issue the
absolute motion in imine. Opponents of this order argue that a trial judge needs a large
degree of flexibility in making determinations of admissibility because the trial itself lacks
a predictable outcome. The absolute motion in limine deprives the judge of flexibility,
since he or she is bound by pretrial rulings. See Comment, supra note 130, at 217. See also
Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 134, at 616.
142. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 134, at 616.
143. Comment, supra note 130, at 223.
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jury.' Thus, "[w]hen the offering party nears the point in the
trial when he feels the evidence should be introduced, the jury. is
excused, and the court determines the admissibility of the evi-
dence." 1 45
Generally, both types of motion in imine require the party
raising the motion to show that prejudice will result from the dis-
closure of the evidence to the jury. 146 Little or no balancing of
interests is involved. The moving party requests simply that an
advance exclusionary ruling be made to prevent an unfair situa-
tion. 147
The motion in limine has many advantages: it isolates highly
prejudicial evidence from the jury, maximizes pretrial discovery,
forces the offering party to evaluate its case and make elections,
helps obtain favorable guilty plea offers, and preserves a record
for appeal. 14  Additionally, pretrial consideration of prejudicial
evidence can simplify, purify, and accelerate the process of ob-
taining just verdicts by isolating the jury from prejudicial infer-
ences and by preventing extensive delays during trial, thereby
allowing the judge and jury to concentrate on substantive is-
sues. 149
The motion has disadvantages as well: it appears to make effi-
cient and just criminal adjudication more difficult, contributes to a
piecemeal trial by increasing the number of separate issues, and
creates additional opportunities for error."'5 Another drawback to
the motion in limine is its discretionary nature-the parties are not
mandated to request this motion, and the trial judge is not obli-
gated to grant it. Nonetheless, two primary advantages of the mo-
tion in limine appear to outweigh these disadvantages. The
motion in imine replaces the frequently ineffective, unrealistic,
and psychologically invalid admonitions to the jury to disregard
144. The order may be issued before the trial begins. Id
145. Id
146. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 134, at 621.
147. Id See Comment, supra note 130, at 224. There is a disagreement regarding the
applicability of the motion in limine to the testimony of the offering party's witnesses. If the
motion in limine does encompass witnesses, the offering party must counsel his or her wit-
nesses against inadvertently mentioning the excluded evidence. If the motion in limine fails
to encompass the witnesses, they are free to volunteer the excluded information in response
to questioning. Comment, supra note 130, at 224.
148. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 134, at 634.
149. Id at 633-34.
150. Id Rothblatt and Leroy contend that the motion in limine can never be .com-
pletely accurate in balancing the probative and prejudicial values of evidence, which is best
evaluated within the total trial context. Id
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certain evidence or occurrences at trial;' 51 and it "provides an ef-
fective means of deterring counsel from offering improper evi-
dence because it warns him in advance that the court will not only
exclude his offer of evidence at trial, but may also use it as a basis
for a new trial or a contempt order."' 152
The motion in limine is a useful pretrial device which could aid
in undercutting the graymail threat because the offering party
would be compelled to rebut the Government's showing of
prejudice in order to offer the controversial evidence at trial.
Moreover, even if the motion is denied by the trial court, both
parties have notice of the classified information at issue, thus elim-
inating surprise at trial. Although the motion in limine may not be
effective in all proceedings, 53 its use in prosecutions in which the
relevance of classified information is at issue may effectively com-
bat the pervasive graymail threat.
C. The State Secrets Privilege
The Government's privilege not to reveal state secrets pertain-
ing to national security when disclosure would compromise that
national security has long been recognized. 154 Consequently, the
assertion of a claim of a state secrets privilege may be useful in
preventing dismissal of a prosecution because of the nondisclosure
of classified information.
As originally proposed by the Supreme Court, the Federal
Rules of Evidence contained a rule defining a privilege for state
secrets and other official information. 55 Although Congress re-
151. One author notes that "while the use of these 'curative measures' can perhaps be
justified in terms of judicial economy, its effectiveness in removing the prejudicial impact
of an improper question is subject to serious doubt." Note, supra note 130 at 741.
152. Id at 744.
153. See note 150 supra and accompanying text.
154. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7, 11 (1953) (claim of privilege may
be invoked when military secrets are involved); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2378-2379
(rev. ed. McNaugton 1961).
The state secrets privilege should be distinguished from two other privileges for govern-
mental information: (1) the privilege protecting the revelation of an informant's identity,
and (2) the privilege shielding "official information." See UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE
508-09. Official information has been defined as information concerning the "internal af-
fairs of the state, acquired by public officials in the course of duty or transmitted from one
public official to another in the course of duty." Zagel, supra note 75, at 875.
155. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 509 provided in part: "The government has a
privilege to refuse to give evidence and to prevent any person from giving evidence upon a
showing of reasonable likelihood of danger that the evidence will disclose a secret of state
or official information, as defined in this rule." Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 509(b), reprinted in
2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 509-1 (1977).
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jected all the proposed rules concerning privileges, 156 a suggestion
has recently been made that Congress enact specific standards
narrowly defining the scope of a state secrets privilege to enable
the government to control more effectively the disclosure of na-
tional security information in criminal litigation.'57
In determining whether information is privileged, a court must
balance the requesting party's need for the information against the
other party's assertion of confidentiality. 58 In United States v.
Nixon,159 however, the Supreme Court suggested that an assertion
of a state secrets privilege would perhaps be treated more deferen-
tially than a claim of privilege based on Executive confidential-
ity. 6 ° In the Nixon case, the Court reaffirmed its earlier
pronouncement in United States v. Reynolds' 6' regarding state
secrets:
It may be possible to satisfy the Court, from all the circum-
stances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that com-
pulsion of the evidence would expose military matters which, in
the interest of national security, should not be divulged. When
this is the case, the occasion for privilege is appropriate, and the
court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is
meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evi-
dence, even by the judge alone in his chambers.162
This language should not be interpreted as implying that mere
assertion of a state secrets privilege perfunctorily places the re-
quested information beyond the province of the courts.163 The
156. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 155. The Supreme Court promulgated
Rule 509 contemporaneously with the Nixon Administration's assertion of executive privi-
lege in response to congressional requests for information. This coincidence may help to
explain the congressional discomfort with Rule 509 since the Rule, like the Nixon Admin-
istration claim, granted the Executive branch wide discretion to withhold information. Id
See generally Berger, How the Privilegefor Governmental Information Met Its Watergate,
25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747 (1975).
157. The Use of Classfled Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 56-57 (remarks of
Phillip Lacovara).
158. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 204, 207 (1978). Professor Tribe
notes that the balancing process could be implemented in several ways. One method would
allow the Executive to handle the process, thereby "rendering an assertion of privilege
tantamount to a finding that the balance of policy considerations favors it." Id Another
method would remit the process to the President only after the judiciary had satisfied itself
that an absolute privilege was actually involved. Finally, the courts could declare them-
selves the final arbiters of the privilege issue or they could request Congress to define the
limits of an absolute privilege. Id See also Zagel, supra note 75, at 877.
159. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
160. Id at 706, 710-11.
161. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
162. Id at 10.
163. Professor Tribe suggests that Reynolds is limited to its factual context because the
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Nixon decision clearly suggested that even classified materials al-
legedly protected by a state secrets privilege should be "delivered
to the District Judge. . . for in camera consideration of the valid-
ity of particular excisions. . . ...'4 Thus, the Reynolds decision
does not require an abdication of judicial scrutiny in state secrets
cases in either the civil or criminal context.165
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the validity of an
absolute privilege for national security information within the
context of a civil case, 166 the scope of the Government's right to
withhold such information in a criminal case is presently unde-
fined.' 67 In criminal prosecutions, perhaps the claimed privilege
should be granted only when the evidence pertains indirectly to
the material issues in the case.' 68 When the proposed evidence
relates directly to the issue of guilt or innocence, the Government,
as prosecutor, should not be permitted to both claim its privilege
and proceed with the prosecution. 69
Court "reversed a lower court's order forcing the government to produce documents relat-
ing to the [design] of a military aircraft which had been engaged in a secret mission per-
taining to the testing of electronic equipment." L. TRIBE, supra note 158, at 212.
Unusually strong evidence of the plane's involvement in a secret mission induced the Court
to bypass in camera inspection. Id Thus, the implication remains that weaker evidence
implicating a state secret would justify in camera inspection.
164. 418 U.S. at 715 n.21.
165. L. TRIBE, supra note 158, at 212.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
167. In criminal cases, the Government, as prosecutor, normally has an obligation to
produce all relevant evidence or suffer dismissal. See, e.g., United States v. Andolschek,
142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944) (Government must choose, in criminal action, between full
disclosure of the content of official reports or no prosecution). Accordingly, courts have
held that the Government cannot properly invoke a state secrets privilege in criminal pros-
ecutions which involve either official information or informant privileges. See, e.g.,
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (failure of trial court to require the disclosure
of informant's identity is reversible error); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d
Cir. 1944) (Government ordered to produce reports defendant made to his superior). Con-
tra, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) (disclosure of informant's identity at pretrial
hearing not required). The validity of the state secrets privilege in criminal prosecutions
received support in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), where the Supreme Court
strongly implied that a claim of absolute privilege could prevail in a criminal case when the
claim was based on military or diplomatic secrecy. Id at 710-11.
168. See note 167 supra.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
920 (1950) (defendant's conviction reversed because the Government refused disclosure of
wiretap records to the defendant on the grounds of national security).
Chief Justice Vinson's dictum in Reynolds demonstrates the increasing acceptance of
this position by the courts:
The rationale of the criminal case is that, since the Government which prosecutes
an accused also has the duty to see that justiceis done, it is unconscionable to
allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental privilege to
deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense.
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The state secrets privilege is often claimed in espionage prose-
cutions, since the espionage statutes make the theft or disclosure
of national security information a criminal offense. In Gorin v.
United States,' the Supreme Court held that it was the jury's
function to determine whether the disputed classified information
did pertain to national security. 171 The requirement that state
secrets be disclosed to the jury in order for it to determine an issue
of fact, however, appears to defeat the purpose of preventing the
disclosure of that classified information which is subject to the
privilege.' 72  Consequently, the Government may be forced to
drop the prosecution rather than risk the disclosure of national
security secrets.
The effect of the assertion of the state secrets privilege on the
further progress of a prosecution must also be considered. Under
the present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial judge
has extensive discretion to impose an array of sanctions if either
the Government's claim of privilege deprives the defendant of
material evidence or the Government fails to comply with a dis-
covery request. 173 Accordingly, upholding the validity of the priv-
ilege claim does not necessarily compel dismissal of the case. 17 1
345 U.S. at 12.
170. 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
171. Id at 32.
172. In Gorin, the Court did not divulge the actual contents of the material to the jury.
It merely defined national defense and its application to the charges against the defendant
for the jury, instructing it to connect the evidence presented with the national security
claim. Thus, the privilege will not be undercut in those cases involving national security
where the contents of the information are not disclosed to the jury. Id at 32-33.
173. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d). Under Rule 16(d), the trial judge is vested with complete
discretion to regulate discovery through the use of protective orders and sanctions. When a
party fails to comply with the provisions of this rule, the judge may (I) order the delinquent
party to permit the discovery or inspection, (2) grant a continuance, (3) prohibit the party
from introducing the undisclosed evidence, or (4) enter another type of order which the
judge deems justified under the circumstances. Additionally, the judge has the power to
specify the time, place and manner of making the discovery and inspection, prescribing
those terms and conditions deemed to be fair. Id
These sanctions could be applied in the graymail cases. Courts have used Rule 16(d) to
widen an otherwise narrow scope of discovery in various cases involving national security
information. See, e.g., United States v. Kampiles, Crim. No. HRC 78-77 (N.D. Ind. Nov.
17, 1978), aI'd No. 78-2646, slip op. (7th Cir. Nov. 15, 1979),peiionfor rehearing denied,
No. 78-2646 (7th Cir. Jan. 24, 1980) (where the district court judge ordered that edited
versions of the top secret KH-I I manual be introduced into evidence at trial). Contra,
United States v. DeMarco, 407 F. Supp. 107 (D.C. Cal. 1975) (where the court dismissed
the prosecution because the Government failed to produce requested exculpatory mate-
rial).
174. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 509 provided that if the privilege deprived the
other party of material evidence, the trial judge could make any further orders in the inter-
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For example, dismissal would be inappropriate if the defendant
does not demonstrate that the information in question would be
helpful or necessary to the preparation of a defense.'17
The remedy available to a defendant in the event that the
Government's claim of privilege is upheld would vary according
to the circumstances of the case. At one extreme, where the utility
of classified information to the defense is totally speculative, the
case could simply continue without disclosure. At the other ex-
treme, where the classified information is central to the issue of
guilt, and no other methods of proof are available, dismissal may
be necessary. In the gray area, the judge could instruct the jury to
assume that the missing information establishes a given proposi-
tion, find against the Government on a given fact, or strike a wit-
ness' testimony rather than dismiss the prosecution.'
76
Privileges are inherently detrimental to a judicial system, as
they exclude potentially useful evidence from the trial; 17 7 govern-
mental privileges are especially undesirable in, and repugnant to,
the fundamental tenets of a democracy.' 78  The magnitude of the
interests protected by the state secrets privileges, however, neces-
sarily requires a more careful balancing of the competing interests
than in cases involving lesser governmental privileges, 179 since
"[i]t is one thing to sacrifice governmental efficiency to assure fair
litigation; it is another to endanger the nation to preserve the in-
tegrity of a litigation system."' 80 Nevertheless, in the interest of
est ofjustice, including (l) striking the testimony of the witness, (2) declaring a mistrial, (3)
finding against the Government on the issue to which the evidence is relevant, or (4) dis-
missing the case. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 509(e), reprinted in 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GER, sulra note 155, at 509-2.
175. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 589 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1979).
176. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 509(e) provided for the use of these sanctions
in the event that a state secrets privilege was upheld. See note 174 supra. The Proposed
Classified Information Criminal Procedures legislation provides for similar sanctions. See
note 238 infra.
177. Zagel, supra note 75, at 909.
178. The general availability ofgovernment information is the fundamental basis upon
which popular sovereignty and the consent of the governed rest. "It is reasonable to assert,
therefore ... that only a limited power to withhold government information can be de-
rived from Articles I and II of the Constitution even apart from the Bill of Rights." Parks,
The Open Government Principle: .Appiying the Right to Know Under the Constitution, 26
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 7 (1950). In the words of James Madison, "A popular Govern-
ment, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a
Farce or Tragedy, or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And [a]
people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives." Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822).
179. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705-06, 708 n.18.
180. Zagel, supra note 75, at 909-10.
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preserving the fairness of the adversary system, the successful as-
sertion of a state secrets privilege should be accompanied by pro-
cedural "penalties." 81
Congress has the authority to prescribe procedural guidelines
and sanctions to govern the effect of a claim of privilege.'82 Con-
gressional action could establish a formal policy directing the
courts to dismiss an action only in those situations where an other-
wise valid claim of privilege abrogates a defendant's right to a
fair trial. 183  Moreover, congressional classifications for state
secrets would better equip the courts to determine the propriety of
the asserted privilege because they would have uniform criteria
with which to balance the Government's and defendant's inter-
ests.184
The state secrets privilege will not solve the graymail dilemma
in every prosecution. It can be used, however, to obviate the "dis-
close or dismiss" dilemma in those cases implicating real and sub-
stantial national security concerns.
The primary disadvantage in relying on the presently available
mechanisms to resolve the graymail dilemma is the ad hoc fashion
in which they are applied. The ambiguity and complexity of the
espionage statutes operate as deterrents to the initiation of espio-
nage prosecutions by the Government, especially when the stat-
utes appear to require the disclosure of the very information they
are designed to protect. Absent specific statutes relating to the dis-
closure of classified information, the prosecution must rely on evi-
dentiary principles. The discretionary application of the rules of
relevance and privilege prevents the development of a consistent
approach to the diverse graymail dilemmas confronting the Gov-
ernment. Although the in camera proceeding affords some protec-
tion against the public dissemination of classified information,
181. Id at 910; see note 174 supra. The proposed graymail legislation also includes
provisions for assessing penalties against the Government in the event of nondisclosure.
See note 238 infra.
182. The Use of Classified Information in Litigation, supra note 5, at 57 (statement of
Phillip Lacovara).
183. One observer has suggested that Congress reevaluate its position regarding the
state secrets privilege, especially now that the Watergate affair has ended. She notes that
promulgation of a rule similar to the rejected Federal Rule of Evidence 509 would allow
Congress to assert its authority with regard to the disclosure of national security informa-
tion. Berger, supra note 156, at 789-90, 795.
184. Cf. Carrow, Governmental Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L.
REv. 166, 179 (1958), where the author notes, "Unfortunately, courts are sometimes per-
suaded to attach the secrets of state label to unrelated matters, and thus dissipate the value
of a clear-cut distinction." See also Zagel, supra note 75, at 877.
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frequent use of this device is costly and disruptive to the proceed-
ings and also fails to eliminate the element of surprise at trial.
Alternatively, the motion in limine offers the prosecution the op-
portunity to obtain advance notice of the defendant's intent to dis-
close classified information, thereby diminishing the danger of
surprise at trial. The judiciary's general reluctance to determine
the admissibility of evidence preliminary to trial, however,
presents a significant obstacle to pretrial exclusion of classified ev-
idence.
Examination of the presently available methods of combatting
graymail highlights the need for the development of a uniform
approach to the dilemma. Providing the judiciary with procedural
and evidentiary guidelines will help to minimize the defendant's
ability to graymail the Justice Department into abandoning a
criminal prosecution and will simultaneously afford a consistent
handling of the disclosure issue.
III. FINDING A MORE EFFECTIVE SOLUTION TO GRAYMAIL:
THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION CRIMINAL TRIAL
PROCEDURES ACT
Congressional concern with the graymail phenomenon re-
sulted in the introduction of three bills before Congress in July
1979.' 8 These legislative proposals, entitled the Classified Infor-
mation Criminal Trial Procedures Act,18 6 present a uniform sys-
tem of rules designed to create a consistent approach to the
problem of classified information in criminal trials. 187 In propos-
ing such uniform rules, the drafters sought to reconcile the public
interest in legitimate law enforcement with the defendant's right
to a fair and public trial through the early, measured, and careful
intervention of the trial judge.' 8
The proposed legislation seeks to ensure an early screening by
185. See Lacovara, supra note 10, at 19, cal. 1. The three bills were introduced into
both houses of Congress on July 11, 1979. See CongressionalRecord, S. 1482, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S9184 (daily ed. July 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Biden); Id H.R.
4736, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H5763 (daily ed. July 11, 1979) (remarks of
Rep. Murphy); H.R. 4745, reprinted in Hearings on H 4745 Before the Subcomm. on
Legislation of the Permanent Select Coma on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 181-94
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 4745].
186. See 125 CONG. REc. H5763 (daily ed. July 11, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Murphy).
187. Id; 125 CONG. REC. S9184 (daily ed. July 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Biden).
188. 125 CONG. REc. H5763 (daily ed. July 11, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Murphy); 125
CONG. REC. S9184 (daily ed. July 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Biden). See also Hearings on
H.R 4736 & H. 4745, supra note 4, at 3-4 (statement of Phillip Lacovara).
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the trial judge of the classified information which the defendant
either proposes to introduce as evidence at trial or wishes to ob-
tain through discovery.18 9  Consequently, the relevance of the
classified information to the material issues at trial is assured.19 0
More generally, however, the proposed bills show congressional
intent that federal courts should give these issues careful and
methodical treatment in accordance with a clearly defined proce-
dural system.' 9 '
A. A Proposed Amendment to the Jencks Act
Enactment of the Jencks Act 92 substantially affected the bal-
ance of advantages enjoyed by the prosecution and -defense, 19 as
the Act allows a defendant to secure prior statements of Govern-
ment witnesses for impeachment purposes. 94 Yet, the advantage
gained by the defendant is not unlimited. Initially, the statements
are obtainable only after the witnesses have openly testified in
court. 95 Disclosure to the defendant is required only when it will
facilitate cross-examination; it is not to be regarded as a general
189. See Hearings on HA 4736 & H 4745, supra note 4, at 3-4 (statement of Phillip
Lacovara).
190. The proposed legislation does not alter the existing rules of relevance, but it does
require the defendant to notify the Government prior to trial of any intention to disclose
classified information at trial. This pretrial notice requirement allows the Government to
obtain an in camera hearing at which the trial judge may examine the proposed evidence
and rule on its admissibility. 125 CONG. REC. H5763 (daily ed. July 11, 1979) (remarks of
Rep. Murphy).
191. 125 CONG. REc. S9184 (daily ed. July 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Biden).
192. Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976)). The Jencks
Act represents the action taken by Congress in response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). In Jencks, the defendant requested the pro-
duction of FBI undercover reports regarding matters to which certain agents had testified
at trial. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to inspect such docu-
ments without determining that the witnesses had used the reports during the trial or that
the reports were inconsistent with their trial testimony. 353 U.S. at 666. Congress enacted
the Jencks Act in an effort to restrict this decision. S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
2-5, reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1861, 1862-64.
193. See generally Goldstein, supra note 1, at 1180-92; Pulaski, Extending the Disclo-
sure Requirement fthe Jencks Act to Defendants: Constitutional and Nonconstitutional Con-
siderations, 64 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8 (1978); Note, The Jencks Right: Judicial and Legislative
Modfcations, the States and the Future, 50 VA. L. REv. 535, 552-53 (1964).
194. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976); Pulaski, supra note 193, at 6; Comment, The Jencks Legis-
lation: Problems in Prospect, 67 YALE L.J. 674, 675 (1958). The Jencks Act provides for the
production of only those statements, in either holographic form or its equivalent, actually
attributable to the witness or which are adopted by the witness. Pulaski, supra note 193, at
6-7.
195. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a)-(b) (1976).
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discovery tool.' 96 Finally, if the prosecution charges that the re-
quested material does not relate to the subject matter of the wit-
ness' testimony, the trial judge reviews the disputed statements in
camera. 97 Irrelevant portions of the requested information are
then excised before the judge releases the information to the de-
fendant. 98 The drafters of the Act intended this judicial review to
protect the confidentiality of Government files, and the names and
identities of Government informants. 199
Two of the three bills which compose the Classified Informa-
tion Criminal Trial Procedure Act contain an amendment to the
Jencks Act.2" The Administration bill 20' restricts the scope of the
Jencks Act by authorizing the trial judge to excise classified infor-
mation which is consistent with the witness' testimony from the
requested materials.20 2 This amendment, therefore, has the poten-
tial to deprive the defendant of information that may be more
than marginally relevant to the defense.
In support of the proposed amendment, the Government con-
tends that neither the Jencks decision 203 nor the Act expressly pro-
vides a sixth amendment right to these materials.2" Rather, it
asserts that the Jencks ruling and statute are simply evidentiary
devices which provide the defendant with access to certain materi-
196. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a), (e)(l)-(2) (1976); S. REP. No. 981, supra note 192, at 4-5,
reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1863-64; Pulaski, supra note 193, at
6.
197. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c) (1976).
198. Id; Pulaski, supra note 193, at 18-19.
199. See S. REP. No. 981, supra note 192, at 2-5, reprintedin [19571 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 1862-64.
200. CongressionalRecord, S. 1482, § 10, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S9184
(daily ed. July 11, 1979); Hearings on H..R. 4745, supra note 185.
201. H.R. 4745, Hearings on HA 4745, supra note 185.
202. Section 10 of H.R. 4745 provides in part:
If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be produced under this
section contains classified information, the United States may deliver such state-
ment for the inspection of the court in camera and provide the court with an
affidavit identifying the portions of the statement that are classified and the basis
for the classification assigned. If the court finds (I) that disclosure of any portion
of the statement identified by the Government as classified could reasonably be
expected to cause damage to the national security in the degree required to war-
rant classification under the applicable Executive order, statute, or regulation, and
(2) that such portion of the statement is consistent with the witness' testimony,
the court shall excise the portion from the statement. With such material excised,
the court shall then direct delivery of such statement to the defendant for his use.
Id § 10.
203. See note 194 supra. Telephone interview with Ronald Stern, Special Assistant to
the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division (Nov. 1, 1979).
204. See note 203 supra.
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als.2 °5 Limiting this access, therefore, will not constitute a blanket
impingement on the constitutional right to counsel and the con-
comitant right to prepare a defense.
The Government admits there may be rare circumstances in
which denial of access to a Jencks-type statement will be tanta-
mount to the denial of a defendant's sixth amendment rights. The
occasional unfairness that could result from the application of the
proposed amendment, however, does not render the amendment
per se unconstitutional.2"6 Supreme Court interpretations of the
Jencks Act support the Government's contention that the Act is
only a limited discovery device for the defendant.20 7
In further support of the proposed amendment, Government
officials contend that the governmental privilege wihich is nor-
mally waived by the initiation of a prosecution 20 8 is not waived as
to classified information which is irrelevant to a defense theory.20 9
If the privilege does not extend to such information, the defendant
will be able to obtain much information, some of which may be
inadmissible in court as useless to the defense.210 Furthermore, if
the information contained within the requested materials is con-
sistent with trial testimony, governmental privilege should apply
since the information may be inadmissible as cumulative evi-
dence.2 "
205. Id
206. Id
207. In Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959), the Supreme Court held that the
Jencks Act was concerned primarily with limiting and regulating defense access to those
statements which were not actually attributable to the witness or which failed to relate to
the witness' testimony at trial. Id at 354. In addition, the Court noted that the Jencks Act
was not intended as an authorization for a general "fishing expedition" by the defendant
for discoverable material, but was intended to preclude disclosure in those cases where the
Act's provisions were inapplicable. Id at 352, 354. Cf The Use of Classofed Information in
Litigation, supra note 5, at 34, where a Justice Department official states: "Clearly we as
prosecutors cannot determine precisely how a defendant can present his case, and although
he has no license to rummage through the Government files at will, a defendant does have
a right to information which may be useful in his defense."
208. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1948); United States
v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503,
506 (2d Cir. 1944).
209. Telephone interview with Ronald Stern, Special Assistant to the Assistant Attor-
ney General, Criminal Division (Nov. 1, 1979).
210. Id
211. Id; see FED. R. EVID. 403. The Government's contentions emphasize that mate-
rial produced under the Jencks Act is nonetheless subject to the rules governing admissibil-
ity of evidence at trial. See, e.g., Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 493 n.12 (1963);
United States v. Berry, 277 F.2d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 1960). Notably, nothing in the language
of the statute indicates that material disclosed to the defense under the statute's provisions
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DISCLOSE OR DISMISS DILEMMA
Congressional debate over the Jencks Act supports the Gov-
ernment's position on privilege and further indicates that the trial
judge, not defense counsel, should determine whether the re-
quested materials relate to the trial testimony. 2 In making such
a determination, however, the consistency of the prior statement
to the testimony of the Government witness should not be the
only factor which is considered. Consistency is neither a valid nor
a complete test of the material's utility to the defense for the pur-
poses of cross-examination. 1 3 The Jencks Act does not presently
require demonstrable inconsistency as the test for the production
of Jencks material, and the courts have not read such a test into
the Act.214
In light of the Jencks Act's present provisions, the proposed
amendment appears unnecessary. Not only does it contravene the
congressional intent underlying the Act,215 but it also simply re-
states objectives already embodied in the current codification. If a
defendant requests the production of classified information which
allegedly relates to a Government witness' testimony, the Jencks
will be admitted into evidence in contravention of the governing rules of evidence. See 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (1976).
212. S. REP. No. 981, supra note 192, at 4, reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 1863. The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly taken the position that poten-
tially impeaching information should be made available to the defendant for whatever use
that party chooses. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975) (primary respon-
sibility of the adversary system is to develop relevant facts on which a determination of
guilt or innocence can be made); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957) (only
the defense is adequately equipped to determine the importance of information to the
case).
One commentator has stated:
[S]ince the accused is best able to determine the use to be made of the relevant
data, the prosecution must turn over directly to him all prior statements of wit-
nesses logically related to the testimony on direct examination. . . . The fact that
evidence is not sufficiently inconsistent with, or material or relevant to, the testi-
mony of a prosecution witness to be admissible need not mean that [the informa-
tion] cannot arm the accused with knowledge essential to neutralization of the
challenged testimony and, perhaps, a resulting successful offense.
Comment, supra note 194, at 677, 680.
213. Hearings on H. 4736 & H. 4745, supra note 4, at 5-6 (statement of Anthony
Lapham). Lapham suggests that the proposed amendment should be softened: prior state-
ments should be withheld only if the court determines that the information contains noth-
ing material to the defense. Id
214. S. REP. No. 981, supra note 192, at 2-5, reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 1862-64; see, e.g., Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1957).
215. The legislative history of the Jencks Act indicates that a defendant in a criminal
trial is entitled to all relevant and competent reports and statements in the Government's
possession which relate to the direct testimony of its witnesses. Only those materials within
operative exclusionary rules are to be withheld from the defense under the Act. See S.
REP. No. 981, supra note 192, at 3, reprintedin [1957] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
1862.
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Act, in its present form, does not require the Government to com-
ply.216 Moreover, the Act does not require dismissal of the prose-
cution in the event of nondisclosure.2" 7
Notably, the Jencks Act is the sole source of mandatory dis-
covery for the defendant.2' 8 Subsequent to the witness' direct tes-
timony, the defendant may request any prior statements as a
matter of right without establishing a preliminary basis of incon-
sistency or other reasons for requesting the documents.2 9 The
proposed amendment eliminates this right by requiring the trial
judge to determine the consistency of the materials to the trial tes-
timony. In effect, the judge is required to determine the usefulness
of the requested information to the defense before releasing the
information. This is clearly a result which the Jencks Act sought
to prevent.22 °
Furthermore, the Senate version of the proposed amendment
also affects a defendant's rights by authorizing the substitution of
a summary of the requested classified information for the actual
information. 22  This provision impinges on the defendant's sixth
amendment right to confront witnesses and to be informed of the
nature of the prosecution's charge against him or her since a sum-
mary is useless for the purposes of cross-examination.2 2 Usurp-
ing defense counsel's power to cross-examine effectively leaves the
defendant with disabled counsel-a result which contravenes the
defendant's constitutional right to effective representation.223
In sum, the proposed amendment narrows the Jencks Act's
coverage and consequently infringes on a defendant's sixth
216. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) (1976).
217. Id .Subsection (d) provides that the court may strike the witness' testimony from
the record and proceed with the trial, or the court may declare a mistrial if such action is
necessary to prevent injustice. Id See also Hearings on H.RA 4736 & H.RA 4745, supra note
4, at 10-12 (statements of Michael G. Scheininger and Thomas A. Guidoboni).
218. Hearings on HR. 4736 & H.R. 4745, supra note 4, at 3-4 (statement of William
Greenhalgh).
219. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3500(a)-(b) (1976).
220. See Reed v. United States, 379 A.2d 1181 (D.C. 1977); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3500(d)-(e)
(1976).
221. Congressional Record, S. 1482, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(d), 125 CONG. REC.
S9184 (daily ed. July 11, 1979).
222. Hearings on HR 4736 & HR 4745, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of William
Greenhalgh).
223. Hearings on HR 4736 & HR 4745, supra note 4, at 5-6 (statement of William
Greenhalgh); see Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 874-75 (1966); Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657, 667-68 (1957). Cf Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 59 (1970)
(effective denial of constitutional right to assistance of counsel occurs if counsel lacks the
opportunity to plan a defense) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. It is also
an unnecessary addition to the current statute, as the Act achieves
the proposed amendment's goal of safeguarding the disclosure of
classified information completely irrelevant to the defendant. The
proposed Classified Information Criminal Trial Procedures
Act,224 however, includes a variety of other procedural mecha-
nisms to resolve the "disclose or dismiss" dilemma.22
B. Pretrial Notice Provisions
In light of the existence of substantive and procedural rules
which can be used to combat graymail,226 it seems clear that al-
though congressional action in this area is mandated, the codifica-
tion of an independent set of statutes and rules is unnecessary.
The same uniformity that the proposed legislation offers can be
achieved simply by integrating the various proposed procedures
with the existing Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence.227 Inserting these proposed proce-
dures into the existing rules would subject them to the constant
scrutiny of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference of the
United States.228 This inclusion would, in turn, provide the judi-
ciary with the opportunity to promulgate necessary modifications
with Congress still retaining the right to initiate independent alter-
ations it deemed necessary. Perhaps the most important provision
in the proposed legislation is the section relating to the pretrial
conference between the parties in the judge's chambers. 229 This
provision is modeled upon Rule 17.1 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure230 which establishes a timetable for pretrial
discovery and provides each party with notice concerning certain
aspects of the evidence to be offered at the trial.23'
224. See note 185 supra.
225. 125 CONG,. REC. S9184 (daily ed. July 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Biden).
226. See notes 71-85 supra and accompanying text.
227. See Hearings on H.R 4736 & H 4745, supra note 4, at 2 (statement of Phillip
Lacovara); id at 2-3 (statement of William Greenhalgh).
228. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-3772 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976).
229. Each bill specifies that "any party may move for a pretrial conference to consider
matters relating to classified information that may arise in connection with the prosecu-
tion." See CongressionalRecord, S.1482, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 125 CONG. REC. S9184
(daily ed. July 11, 1979); H.R. 4736, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101, 125 CONG. REC. H5763
(daily ed. July 11, 1979); H.R. 4745, § 3, Hearings on HR 4745, supra note 185.
230. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.1.
231. Rule 17.1 provides:
At any time after the filing of the indictment or information the court upon
motion of any party or upon its own motion may order one or more conferences
to consider such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. At the con-
1980]
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The effectiveness of the existing procedural devices would be
greatly enhanced if Congress required a mandatory pretrial notice
and hearing at which the proposed disclosure of the classified in-
formation would be discussed. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure contain similar directives in Rules 12.1232 and 12.2233
which provide that a defendant who intends to rely upon an alibi
or insanity defense must, upon demand by the Government, pro-
vide pretrial notice of that intent and details of the circumstances
and supporting witnesses.234
This mandatory pretrial notice would reduce the impact and
number of graymail threats. The classified information would be
viewed in camera by the trial judge to determine its relevance to
the defense prior to a determination of admissibility. This proce-
dure would identify the precise nature of the classified informa-
tion that could be disclosed at trial. If the judge rules that the
evidence is admissible, the Government still receives an opportu-
nity to balance the risks of disclosure of the particular information
clusion of a conference the court shall prepare and file a memorandum of the
matters agreed upon. No admissions made by the defendant or his attorney at the
conference shall be used against the defendant unless the admissions are reduced
to writing and signed by the defendant and his attorney. This rule shall not be
invoked in the case of a defendant who is not represented by counsel.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.1.
232. Rule 12.1 provides in part:
Upon written demand of the attorney for the government stating the time, date,
and place at which the alleged offense was committed, the defendant shall serve
within ten days, or at such different time as the court may direct upon the attor-
ney for the government a written notice of his intention to offer a defense of alibi.
Such notice by the defendant shall state the specific place or places at which the
defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names
and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to establish such
alibi.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(a).
233. Rule 12.2 provides in part:
If a defendant intends to rely upon the defense of insanity at the time of the
alleged crime, he shall, within the time provided for the filing of pretrial motions
or at such later time as the court may direct, notify the attorney for the govern-
ment in writing of such intention and file a copy of such notice with the clerk. If
there is a failure to comply with the requirements of this subdivision, insanity
may not be raised as a defense. The court may for cause shown allow late filing
of the notice or grant additional time to the parties to prepare for trial or make
such other order as may be appropriate.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(a).
234. See notes 232-33 supra. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these
rules in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). In Williams, the Court held that a Florida
criminal procedure rule requiring pretrial disclosure of an alibi defense by the defendant
did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. Id at 83. The alibi rule was
designed to enhance the search for truth in the criminal proceeding by ensuring both the
defendant and the prosecution ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the
determination of guilt or innocence. Id
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against the objectives of pursuit of the prosecution before the no-
toriety and additional complications of the trial are thrust upon it.
C. Reciprocal Discovery Provisions
Discovery in the criminal context is an attempt to balance the
prosecution's extensive information gathering mechanisms against
the defendant's need for access to materials with which to prepare
an adequate defense.3 5 Reciprocal discovery is part of this bal-
ance and, as such, was constitutionally mandated by Wardius v.
Oregon,236 in which the Supreme Court interpreted the due pro-
cess clause as requiring that discovery be a "two-way street," ab-
sent strong state interests to the contrary. 37 If a defendant obtains
classified information, reciprocal discovery obligates the Govern-
ment to provide the defendant with "the information it expects to
use to rebut the particular classified information at issue." 8 One
of the three bills proposed by Congress to resolve the graymail
dilemma, however, omits any reciprocity provision between de-
fendant and prosecutor.2 39 In essence, this omission requires the
defendant to disclose the intended role of the classified informa-
tion in his or her case prior to hearing the prosecution's case.2
This result dictates that other safeguards need to be employed so
that classified information is not protected at the expense of a de-
fendant's constitutional rights.
D. The Government's Right to an Interlocutory Appeal
The Government's present right to an interlocutory appeal is
limited to decisions which set aside or dismiss an indictment or
information and decisions which arrest a judgment of convic-
235. See Nakell, Criminal Discoveryfor the Defense and the Prosecution--the Develop-
ing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REv. 437, 439-40, 443 (1972). See also Pye,
The Defendant's Casefor More Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 82 (1963).
236. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
237. Id at 474-75.
238. Congressional Record, H.R. 4736, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107(a)(1), 125 CONG.
REC. H5763 (daily ed. July 11, 1979). If the Government fails to comply with such an
order, the court "may exclude any evidence not made the subject of a required disclosure
and may prohibit the examination by the United States of any witness with respect to such
information." Id § 107(b).
239. Both H.R. 4736 and S. 1482 contain reciprocity provisions requiring the disclosure
of rebuttal evidence by the prosecution. See id; S. 1482, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(c), 125
CONG. REC. S9184 (daily ed. July 11, 1979).
240. Hearings on H..!? 4736 & HR. 4745, supra note 4, at 4-5 (statement of Otto
Obermaier). See generally K. DAvIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1966).
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tion.2 41 Traditionally, the prosecution's right to an interlocutory
appeal has been limited because the use of this extraordinary de-
vice can adversely affect the defendant's constitutional right to a
speedy trial.2 42  The proposed legislation at issue provides the
Government with the right to an interlocutory appeal following a
trial court's order to disclose classified information, imposition of
sanctions for nondisclosure, or refusal to grant a protective order
sought by the prosecution to prevent disclosure,243 if the prosecu-
tor certifies that the appeal is not a dilatory tactic.244 The pro-
posed legislation also provides for special expeditious
procedures245 to avoid disruption at trial and to ensure that the
defendant's interest in a speedy trial is protected. For example,
the legislation provides a stringent timetable for the disposition of
the appeal by the appellate court. The court must hear oral argu-
ment and render a decision within eight days of the adjournment
of the trial.246 To further expedite its decision, the appellate court
may dispense with a written opinion.247 While these procedures
increase the likelihood that the Government's right to an interloc-
utory appeal will not disrupt the flow of the criminal proceeding
any more than the customary granting of a continuance by the
trial judge, they may not be the best solution to the graymail di-
lemma.
E. An Alternative Proposal
A distinct set of codified rules devoted to the resolution of the
graymail dilemma appears unnecessary in light of the relatively
small number of cases in which the graymail threat occurs.248
241. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
242. U.S. CONST., amend. VI; see, e.g., Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96 (1967)
(citing DiBello v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962)); Carroll v. United States, 354
U.S. 394 (1957). The prosecution does, however, enjoy the right to an interlocutory appeal
in at least one jurisdiction. See D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 11-721(a)(3), 23-104 (,Vest 1973).
243. E.g., Congressional Record, H.R. 4736, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 108, 125 CONG.
REC. H5764 (daily ed. July 11, 1979). This provision eliminates the need to seek a writ of
mandamus when the trial judge rules adversely for the Government as was necessary in the
Berrellez case. See notes 61-70 supra and accompanying text.
244. The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, or a designated Assistant Attor-
ney General must certify that the appeal is not for the purpose of delay. E.g., Congressional
Record, H.R. 4736, 125 CONG. REC. H5764 (daily ed. July 11, 1979).
245. See, e.g., Congressional Record, H.R. 4736, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 108, 125 CONG.
REC. H5764 (daily ed. July 11, 1979).
246. Id
247. Id
248. Hearings on HR 4736 & H.. 4745, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of Phillip B.
Heymann).
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Amending the existing rules of criminal procedure and the rules
of evidence, however, could efficiently control the use of the
graymail tactic. The Classified Information Criminal Trial Proce-
dures Act's249 emphasis on pretrial notice heightens the attractive-
ness of this approach.
An amendment to the Jencks Act appears unnecessary, since
all discoverable prior statements, including those obtained under
the Act, are subject to the rules of relevance controlling the admis-
sibility of evidence at trial.250 In addition, since the Act does not
require dismissal of a prosecution in the event of nondisclosure of
requested materials, the defendant's ability to disclose Jencks-type
information at trial is further limited.25' The combination of the
Act's sanctions with the federal evidentiary rules of relevance
greatly diminishes the necessity for enacting the proposed Jencks
amendment.
Commentary on the proposed graymail legislation demon-
strates a concern with the lack of pretrial notice afforded the Gov-
ernment by the present procedural mechanisms.2 52 The core of
the proposed legislation is its provision for a pretrial hearing, at
either party's request, at which the classified information issues
relevant to the case can be reviewed.253 This pretrial notice warns
the Government in advance of potential graymail situations that
could arise at trial, thus providing it with the opportunity to secure
a pretrial ruling on the relevance or admissibility of the classified
information at issue. 4
The proposed legislation's pretrial notice provision is analo-
gous to the pretrial notice requirements in cases in which the de-
fendant intends to raise either an alibi or insanity defense. Under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant in these
instances must provide the prosecution with advance notice.255
The identical procedure in classified information cases would en-
sure advance notice to the prosecution of the potential graymail
threat. Congress need only amend the existing Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure by adding a new rule which would require
mandatory pretrial notice if the defendant intends to disclose clas-
249. See note 185 supra.
250. See notes 208-12 supra and accompanying text.
251. See notes 215-17 supra and accompanying text.
252. See notes 185-91 supra and accompanying text.
253. 125 CONG. Rac. H5763 (daily ed. July 11, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Murphy).
254. See text following note 234 supra.
255. See notes 232-34 supra and accompanying text.
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sifted information. This rule could also provide for reciprocal dis-
covery between defendant and prosecution." 6
In addition, Congress could amend the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence by adding a rule similar to the rape shield rule.257 Under
this rule, the defendant is required to provide the court with ad-
vance notice of an intent to offer evidence of specific instances of
the alleged victim's past sexual behavior.2  Similarly, the new
rule could require written advance notice of the defendant's intent
to offer classified information as evidence. Amendment of the ex-
isting procedural and evidentiary rules could provide a
mandatory, uniform mechanism for securing pretrial notice and
bypassing a possible graymail threat at trial. By affording the
Government advance warning of the classified information issue,
the Government could calculate the risks involved in further
prosecutorial proceedings.25
9
One disturbing aspect of the proposed legislation is the provi-
sion for an in camera, exparte proceeding.26 The more these pro-
cedures are used, the less subject the Government is to the
adversary process. The exparte proceeding is often unnecessary
and prejudicial to the defendant, since the trial judge decides the
relevance of evidence without the benefit of the adversary pro-
cess. 26' A better approach, which would force the prosecution to
cohform to the adversary process, would require the prosecution
to submit proof that the national security privilege has been prop-
erly invoked. Maintaining the adversarial process in the in cam-
256. See notes 235-40 supra and accompanying text.
257. FED. R. EVID. 412.
258. Id 412(c).
259. This approach would also work with regard to the proposed Government right of
interlocutory appeal. Section 3731 of title 18 could be amended to include a Government
right to appeal from any adverse decision of the trial court in classified information cases.
260. Only the Administration bill (H.R. 4745) includes a provision for this type of hear-
ing. Section 6(b) allows the Government to present its reasons for nondisclosure of the
classified information in an in camera, ex parle hearing. H.R. 4745 § 6(b), Hearings on
H.R. 4745, supra note 185.
261. In Jencks, the Supreme Court stated: "What is true before the case is opened is
equally true as the case unfolds. The trial judge cannot perceive or determine the relevance
and materiality of the documents to the defense without hearing defense argument, after
inspection, as to its bearing upon the case. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 669 n.14
(1957). The court further stated:
Because only the defense is adequately equipped to determine the effective use [of
evidence] for the purpose of discrediting the Government's witness and thereby
furthering the accused's defense, the defense must initially be entitled to see them
to determine what use may be made of them. Justice requires no less.
Id at 668-69.
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era hearing would thus allow the court to make a well informed
choice regarding the classified information at issue.
The use of protective orders would eliminate the need for ex
parte proceedings,262 as they afford defendants and defense coun-
sel access to sensitive materials, but restrict their freedom to dis-
seminate further such materials.2 63 A standard form protective
order should be created 264 which could be tailored to the specific
circumstances of a particular case.
In sum, provision for mandatory pretrial notice would remove
much of the arbitrariness inherent in the present procedural and
evidentiary rules applicable to the resolution of the graymail di-
lemma. Although no mechanism may ever be completely effective
in solving the graymail dilemma, mandatory pretrial notice
presents a more effective means of confronting the dilemma than
any mechanism presently available.
CONCLUSION
Graymail presents a formidable obstacle to upholding the in-
tegrity of the criminal justice system. Justice cannot be achieved
when some defendants go free simply because their access to clas-
sified information permits them to enjoy a prosecutorial immu-
nity. Procedural rules tailored to resolve this problem and the
graymail dilemma it creates are needed. The question is not
whether new solutions are necessary, but rather, how severe the
solutions must be.
The goal of criminal procedure is to secure a just adjudication
of the issues before the court. This goal can be achieved only
through a careful balancing of the Government's interests in retri-
bution and deterrence against the defendant's interests in a fair
trial and his or her ultimate liberty. The Government's concern in
262. Both H.R. 4736 and S. 1482 contain provisions providing for the issuance of pro-
tective orders to prevent the compromise of classified information by the defendant. Con-
gressionalRecord, H.R. 4736, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 109, 125 CONG. REC. H5763-64 (daily
ed. July 11, 1979); Id, S. 1482, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 125 CONG. REC. S9184 (daily ed.
July 11, 1979). Use of the protective order to prevent the dissemination of classified infor-
mation has enabled the Government to prosecute successfully several graymail cases. See,
eg., United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51 (1978) (classified information remained
within the physical custody of the court with strict limitations regarding disclosure and
notetaking placed upon the defense).
263. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, Crim. No. 78-00179 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 1978) (pro-
tective order provided for the redaction of documents by the Government before the dis-
closure to the defendants).
264. See Espionage Laws and Leaks, supra note 5, at 18-19 (statement of Anthony
Lapham).
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eliminating graymail cannot be upheld at the expense of the de-
fendant's constitutional rights. The solution to graymail must
strike a new balance: a balance in which both national security
secrets and defendants' sixth amendment rights are protected.
KAREN H. GREVE
AUTHOR'S NOTE
Congressional concern with the graymail phenomenon ulti-
mately resulted in the recent enactment of the Classified Informa-
tion Procedures Act.265 The Act provides a comprehensive
pretrial, trial, and appellate procedural framework for the disclo-
sure of classified information in criminal cases, but it does so with-
out amending the Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal
Procedure. The core of the new legislation is its provision for a
pretrial conference pursuant to either party's request. At this con-
ference the classified information issues relevant to the case can be
reviewed, and the court may consider any matters which relate to
classified information or which promote a fair and expeditious
trial.266 Importantly, any admissions made by the defense during
the pretrial conference cannot be used against the defendant at
trial, unless the admission is reduced to writing and signed by
both the defendant and defense counsel.267
The Classified Information Procedures Act contains a
mandatory pretrial notice provision analogous to those required
in cases where the defendant intends to raise either an alibi or
insanity defense. Under the Act, if the defendant intends to dis-
close classified information in connection with a pretrial or trial
proceeding, the Government and the court must be notified in
writing.268 Additionally, the Act prohibits the defendant from dis-
closing the classified information until the Government has had a
reasonable opportunity to move for a hearing at which a proce-
dure for the requested disclosure may be established. Moreover, if
the defendant fails to comply with the Act's pretrial notice re-
quirement, the court in its discretion may preclude disclosure of
265. Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 49 U.S.L.W. 187
(1980).
266. Id § 2.
267. Id
268. Id § 5(a).
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the classified information or may prohibit the defense from exam-ining any witness with regard to classified information. These
provisions should provide the Government with the advance
warning necessary for it to be aware of the possible graymail
problems arising during the course of the prosecution. Thus,
many of the "disclose or dismiss" dilemmas of the past should be
avoided in the future.269
Under the Act's terms, the Government may secure a pretrial
ruling regarding the use, relevance or admissibility of the classi-
fied information by requesting the district court to conduct an in
camera hearing.27 0 Before the court holds the hearing, however,
the Government must notify the defendant of the classified infor-
mation at issue.27' The Act requires the Government to describe
the information with specificity only if the defendant previously
had access to the information; otherwise, the Government need
only describe the information generally. 72 If the Government
succeeds in preventing the disclosure to the defendant of court-
ordered classified information, the Act requires the court to dis-
miss the indictment or information, unless a lesser sanction will
better serve the interests of justice.27 3 Thus, the new Act requires
the Government to make a calculated choice between nondisclo-
sure of the classified information and prosecution of the defend-
ant.
Additionally, the Classified Information Procedures Act in-
cludes a reciprocity provision which requires the Government to
disclose to the defendant any information which it intends to use
to rebut the classified information.274 In fact, the court may place
the Government under a continuing duty to disclose all rebuttal
information to the defendant as this information becomes avail-
able.275 If the Government fails to comply with the reciprocity
requirement, the court may subject it to sanctions similar to those
imposed upon the defendant for failing to notify the prosecution
of an intent to disclose classified information not disclosed.276 It
appears, therefore, that discovery, at least with respect to rebuttal
information, should be a "two-way street" under the Act.
269. Id § 5(a)-(b).
270. Id § 6(a).
271. Id § 6(b).
272. Id
273. Id § 6(e)(2).
274. Id § 6(f).
275. Id
276. Id
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Although the Classified Information Procedures Act provides
for the issuance of protective orders to guard against the indis-
criminate dissemination of classified information by the defend-
ant, it unfortunately provides for an in camera, ex parte
proceeding.277 This exparte provision enables the Government to
bypass the adversarial process, allowing it simply to submit a writ-
ten statement to the court requesting authorization to delete speci-
fied items of classified information from requested documents to
substitute a summary of the information for these classified docu-
ments, or to substitute a statement admitting the relevant facts
that the classified information would tend to prove.278 Upon ex
parte inspection of this statement, the court may order either the
deletion or substitution of the classified information as requested
by the Government. 279 Thus, the pretrial discovery of these items
by the defense will be prohibited without giving the defense the
benefit of an adversarial in camera hearing.
Even if the court conducts an in camera hearing with both par-
ties present and subsequently orders the disclosure of the classified
information to the defendant, the Government may still prevent
disclosure by requesting the court to order either a proffer of the
relevant facts to be proven by the classified information or a sum-
mary of the requested classified information.280 If the court deter-
mines that the proffer or summary will provide the defendant with
substantially the same ability to prepare an adequate defense as
would the disclosure of the specific information, it must grant the
Government motion.28' It thus appears that the Act authorizes
the trial court to assume the role of the defense attorney in deter-
mining what classified information will be necessary to secure the
defendant's sixth amendment right to prepare an adequate de-
fense. Apparently, Congress envisioned no impingement of the
defendant's sixth amendment rights by requiring the preparation
of a defense and the confrontation of Government witnesses using
only a summary or a proffer of the requested classified informa-
tion.
The Government's concern in eliminating graymail is indeed
meritorious and the newly enacted Classified Information Proce-
dures Act seems to be an effective weapon with which to combat
277. Id §§ 4, 6(c)(2).
278. Id § 4.
279. Id
280. Id § 6(c)(I).
281. Id
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the "disclose or dismiss" dilemma. Although the Act's procedural
rules present a viable solution to the graymail problem, they ap-
pear, unfortunately, to favor the Government's interests in retri-
bution and deterrence over the defendant's interests in a fair trial.
Thus, this new congressional solution to graymail strikes a new
balance: a balance in which national security secrets may indeed
be protected at the expense of the defendant's sixth amendment
rights.
